Contents:

1 – Democracy Bereft: How and Why the First Ever Democracy in Egypt Failed
by Michael Chmielewski

25 – Long-Term Crisis Leadership
by Nathan Baron

31 – Issues of Power and Dominant Masculinity in Pinter’s The Collection and The Homecoming
by Beth Kelln

41 – Community Leadership Project: Listen to Dis"Voice Fundraiser
by Laura Beatch

49 – Human Nature and Political Community
By Alex Cousins
The Campion College Alpha Sigma Nu Journal is published by the Campion College Chapter of Alpha Sigma Nu, the International Honour Society for Jesuit Institutions of Higher Learning. The journal celebrates the scholarship of students in courses taken at Campion College. Scholarship is one of the three ideals of Jesuit education, along with loyalty and service. The student papers have been recommended for publication in the journal by the Campion professors in the courses for which they were written. Other submissions are approved by the editors of the journal. For this volume the editor is Professor Lee Ward.
DEMOCRACY BEREFT: HOW AND WHY THE FIRST EVER DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT FAILED

By: Michael Chmielewski

INTRODUCTION

The military dictatorship of general and President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which now lords over Egypt, a country that only a few short years ago during the Arab Spring was filled with optimism for a better and more democratic future. Bread, freedom, and justice, a chant of the Egyptian protestors that filled Tahrir Square and other public forums across Egypt, was never fulfilled as a few years later, pessimism has been substituted for optimism, and the Arab Spring has become the Arab Winter. Very little of that hope remains for the region that has changed drastically since 2011: Egypt’s revolution failed; Libya is tattered after the fall of Gaddafi; Syria’s fascist dictator Bashar al-Assad held onto to power by fighting his citizens, eventually spawning a civil war that has resulted in thousands of deaths and many more thousands displaced; the world has also seen the rise of ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and their fiery brand of fundamentalist Islam; and most recently, the invasion of Yemen. One can see why many were so hopeful for a democratic surge to turn into something more - tangible rule of the people – in a region that has rarely experienced it and seems farther away than ever from it today. It is timely to now look back at a democracy that failed and why.

In 2012, Egypt had a democratic election, the first ever in a country that has a long and storied history stretching back to antiquity. All too soon came another first for the country as that democracy, and the government of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, was toppled in 2013. In one year, democracy died in the cradle shortly after birth. Why? Now is a pertinent and critical time to find out what happened to the Muslim Brotherhood government and why.

The objective of this thesis is to understand why the Morsi/Muslim Brotherhood government fell. Given the hope the Arab Spring conferred, why is it that this case failed like it did? Indeed it came to naught uniquely as some countries involved in the Arab Spring, like Tunisia, ended up more stable, while some ended up far worse than before, like Syria. The Egyptian experience of the Arab Spring and its aftermath lies somewhere in between these two. Thus, Egypt can be seen as a unique experiment in democracy, and from a political science standpoint it is pertinent to analyze this experiment to see what went wrong and how it could have been made better. The short and injured flight of democracy in Egypt is critical to understanding democracy because the country’s experience is now a part of democratic history. Why, in this history, is it that some democracies succeed, and others fail? Although analyzing all
successful and failed democracies is outside the scope of this thesis, it is within the scope to ask, analyze, and find out why this particular experiment in democracy ultimately failed.

Therefore, the research question(s) of this thesis will be why did something, at first so optimistic, the first democratic election in the long history of Egyptian society, faltter? What was missing that could have guaranteed success, or what were elements that led to its failure? What went wrong? By extension, one secondary yet fundamental research question will be the “what”: what happened? These are important questions for various reasons. Firstly, none of them have been answered, and if so, not satisfactorily. Also, the research questions and this investigation are justified because democracy is, unabashedly, the system of government that all states and nations deserve to live in, and Egypt is no exception. There is no relativism on this point. Finding how and why democracy fell will also shed light on how new democracies are to be understood (and what mistakes they should avoid), especially in the context of the Arab Spring and Middle East. Also, Egypt is a perfect case to analyze because so many of the issues they faced – alternatives to democratic rule, a multicultural society, and governments trying to grab extra power for their reasonable comprehensive doctrine – are all issues that will not disappear soon, but rather, must be solved from both a democratic and political science standpoint.

As for the methodology of the thesis, a qualitative approach makes the most sense for many reasons. Firstly, the thesis, although analyzing events and recounting a bit of history, will ground itself firmly in a Rawlsian theoretical framework to analyze the research questions of interest here. Also, since there is some history that needs to be recounted, a qualitative approach makes good sense. Because of both the theoretical and historical aspects of the paper, there are a lot of moving parts, and the best way to tie all of these together will be to use a qualitative approach to paint a comprehensive picture of what happened to the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. Thus, the bulk of the work for the thesis will be critically analyzing any primary and secondary sources related the research questions here.

This thesis will be divided into six chapters to best answer these research questions. The first chapter is this introduction; the second chapter will introduce and explain a Rawlsian framework; the third chapter will ask who is the Muslim Brotherhood; all the relevant history pertaining to the research questions will be the subject of chapter four; the political science chapter, that of answering the research questions, will constitute the fifth chapter; lastly, chapter six will be the thesis’ conclusion.

The theoretical and conceptual approach to be employed by this thesis will be a Rawlsian one, focusing specifically on appropriate and helpful sections of his 1993Political Liberalism as well as the essay “The Idea of Public Reason” (Rawls, 1993). Not only does Rawls sketch out what an ideal democracy might look like, but he also goes into depth into how it might be conceived. It is thus useful to explain this at the start of the thesis, as it shows what an ideal democracy might look like, but also because the Rawlsian framework will be of use in chapter five, namely answering the research questions,
so it will be useful to keep all of Rawls’ ideas in mind while reading about the Brothers and the applicable history.

Chapter three will explore who the Muslim Brotherhood is, from their origin to their fall from power. Their history is long and vast, and they are very embedded in Egyptian society and culture, or perhaps were. Thus, only the parts relevant to answering the questions set here will be analyzed.

To fully understand why they fell, one needs to understand the circumstances, and chapter four will detail, from academic and trustworthy news sources, all the relevant events, from the Arab Spring to Morsi’s fall. The section will stop there, as the events after the military’s coup d’état, although important, are outside of the scope of this thesis.

Chapter five, the pivotal one, sets out to answer the research questions considering a Rawlsian framework, the nature of the Muslim Brothers and their actions.

The hypothesis is that the Muslim Brotherhood government fell because that government inspired in various ways unrest amongst the Egyptian population, and this popular unrest was coupled with a strong military overthrowing the government. The factor shared in common here is that the military seemed to ironically wait until popular unrest, a healthy democratic expression, was at a fever pitch to exploit rather than preemptively carrying out a coup d’état.

CHAPTER 2: RAWLSIAN FRAMEWORK

In the introduction to Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls identifies what he calls a “serious problem” in modern democratic societies that Egypt was certainly symptom to, even in its infancy: “A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supports that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime” (p. xvi). Thus, Rawls addresses the problem of political liberalism, which is very similar to the aforementioned research question, only here in the context of Egypt, while Rawls looks at the general problem: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?” (p. xviii). The questions Rawls poses here, and their subsequent answers, will help answer the questions that Egypt faced as well. Rawls aptly identifies the issues at the heart of Egypt’s democracy, and thus proves his
utility for not only a vocabulary and framework in which to discuss Egypt, but also a critical lens under which to analyze it.

Also at the heart of this thesis, to answering exactly why the Muslim Brotherhood government did not survive, is the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization (this fact will be looked at in more detail later). Thus, it will be pertinent to ask and explore if there is a tension between Islam and democracy (or at least the unique form of Islam espoused by the Brothers in Egypt). Or, the failure of the Morsi government may be more so attributed to the divide in comprehensive doctrines between the various elements of Egyptian society including religious Muslims, secularists, Egypt’s Coptic Christians and others. This tension is at the heart of the Islamic and multicultural question in Egypt, and may indeed shed light on the research question of why the Muslim Brotherhood government fell. It is evident that a Rawlsian framework will be more than worthwhile here. What follows is an explanation – not use, which will come later - of key elements of Rawls philosophy as it pertains to the Egyptian case.

John Rawls’, the famous and influential 20th century philosopher, work focused on liberal democracy and how best to conceive it in writings such as Political Liberalism and the “The Idea of Public Reason,” the two employed here.

Political Liberalism was Rawls’ 1993 update to the famous A Theory of Justice, which will not be used here, only the update, because, as Rawls writes, the main aim of Political Liberalism is to “say how the well-ordered society of justice as fairness (set out in A Theory of Justice [1971]…is to be understood once it is adjusted to the fact of reasonable pluralism…and regulated by a political conception of justice” (p. xxxv-xxxvi). Only a page later Rawls poses the question, “How is it possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic regime?”(p. xxxvii). The late philosopher explains that there needs to be an overlapping consensus, not simply a modus vivendi (p. xxxvii). Rawls’ answers, and how he comes to those answers, will help answer the ones set here. Along with an explanation of “The Idea of Public Reason,” Rawls’ original position, veil of ignorance, and the modus vivendi, constitutional consensus, and overlapping consensus will be elucidated.

Firstly, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine needs to be defined. According to Rawls, it has three main components: it is an exercise of theoretical reason, meaning it covers the “the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life” in an organized fashion; it is also an exercise in practical reason, meaning that it gives certain issues “a particular primacy and weight”; lastly, “while a reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine…[it is not] subject to sudden and unexplained changes,” rather, it evolves slowly (p. 59). This definition is loose by design, for it would be “unreasonable without strong
grounds based on clear aspects” to designate a doctrine as unreasonable because Rawls does not want political liberalism to be “arbitrary and exclusive” (p. 59). Rawls adds that “reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though different from their own” (p. 60). Alternatively put, one should also try not to use state power to put their comprehensive doctrine ahead of others’.

The original position is Rawls’ substitute for the Hobbesian and Rousseauian state of nature debate. Rather than engaging in this tricky discourse, the original position is concerned with finding “the most appropriate principles for realizing liberty and equality once society is viewed as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens” (p. 22). Paraphrasing Rawls, there must be fair terms in engaging in the original position, and these are that “these conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some persons greater bargaining advantages than others” (p. 23).

The background framework – of society and of a person’s personal views – needs to be blocked out to ensure a fair process. Thus, the veil of ignorance is introduced because the original position cannot be obstructed by the views of its parties, or whomever is being represented: “for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies” (p. 23). These past influences will only project onto the new agreement if they are not accounted for. Also, the parties in the original position must be “symmetrically situated” (p. 24).

There are different types of veils, from a thin to a thick one, essentially dictating how much the representatives can see. Since a thick veil is preferable to mitigate the negative societal influences that could creep into the original position, Rawls solves a problem by introducing “the notion of primary goods” so that a thick veil does not block basic requirements: “[t]he problem is that given the restrictions of the veil of ignorance, it may seem impossible for the parties to ascertain these persons’ good and therefore to make a rational agreement on their behalf” (p. 307). These goods include basic liberties (“freedom of though and liberty of conscience and so on”), freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, “powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility,” income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (p. 308-309).

Calling it a device of representation, Rawls succinctly explains that the original position describes parties whom are “responsible for the essential interests of a free and equal citizen, as fairly situated and as reaching an agreement subject to conditions that appropriately limit what they can put forward as good reasons” (p. 25). Thus, as a device of representation, the original position is also a device of limitation with the veil of ignorance. It sets certain constraints on the parties within to better represent those outside. Since there are so many comprehensive doctrines to deal with outside the original position, inside the device must be free from them. That is, by excluding them, they are all included: they all have a fair shot
of being represented or chosen. This logic also applies to removing the distortions of race, gender, and native endowments.

Rawls sums this up well in footnote 27(25): “this enable[sic] us to find a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism”(p. 25). This is the rationale of a thick veil of ignorance, as opposed to a thin one. A thin veil would include comprehensive doctrines, and Rawls implies this in the same footnote (p.24). The goal here, for Rawls and for Egypt, is to achieve and maintain a constitutional consensus after a mere modus vivendi, eventually striving for an overlapping consensus. There needs to be a collaboration and consensus, because for Rawls, “no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime”(p.135). Rather than picking a doctrine, an imperfect modus vivendi is first established. This is literally only a way of living together; there is simply an agreement to coexist in an uneasy tension, like the peace lines in Belfast, preventing Catholics and Protestants from slaughtering one another.

An overlapping consensus is radically different. The beauty is that since it is an overlapping consensus, the words chosen carefully, it is drawn from all reasonable doctrines, hence the social cohesion and social stability. An overlapping consensus goes far beyond picking institutions or authorities, because all “those who affirm the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirmation”(p.148). Not only is the consensus founded on the basis of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines of society, but an overlapping consensus for this very same fact is harder to overthrow from within, owing to the fact of stability, as “those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society increase and eventually become dominant” (p.148).

But, this overlapping consensus may seem a tad utopian, especially for a nascent democracy like that of Egypt. It could be argued convincingly that even Canada, a very stable democracy, does not have an overlapping consensus, as there is a province that every once in a while threatens to leave and a structural issue with treaty and the Indian Act, Rawls would probably peg Canada as closer to what he terms a constitutional consensus. This is a step between the unstable modus vivendi and the hard-to-achieve overlapping consensus. A constitutional consensus would entail “a constitution satisfying certain basic principles [which] establishes democratic electoral procedures for moderating political rivalry within society…The constitutional consensus is not deep and it is not wide: it is narrow in scope, not
including the basic structure but only the political procedures of democratic government” (p. 158-159).

Rawls summarizes how this method of governance comes about.

At the first stage of constitutional consensus the liberal principles of justice, initially accepted reluctantly as a modus vivendi adopted into a constitution, tend to shift citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so that they at least accept the principles of a liberal constitution. These principles guarantee certain basic political rights and liberties and establish democratic procedures for moderating the political rivalry, and for determining issues of social policy. To this extent citizens’ comprehensive views are reasonable if they were not so before: simple pluralism moves toward reasonable pluralism and constitutional consensus is achieved (p.163-164).

After a strong constitutional consensus is brought about, like in Canada, eventually, through the processes and institutional bodies established, society inches towards an overlapping consensus, because “[g]radually, as the success of political cooperation continues, citizens gain increasing trust and confidence in on another” (p. 168).

Next, Rawls’ essay entitled “The Idea of Public Reason” (Rawls, 1993) explains what public reason entails: “Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people; it is the reasons of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship” (p. 213). It is used to formulate its plans, putting various ends in order of priority, and of making decisions (p. 212). This public reason’s subject is the good of the public (p. 213), a tremendously democratic idea. This is an idea to strive for, as “it describes what is possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that” (p. 213).

Decisions made from public reason are not quotidian. Rather, it applies to “only to those [questions] involving what we may call ‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice” (p. 214). Rawls gives an example of the types of questions that public reason is conceptualized to answer: “who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the special subject of public reason” (p. 214). This type of reason is limited though, for example, Rawls states that it does not apply to “personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and universities” (p. 215). Yet, when citizens take a public role it applies, such as political advocacy in the public forum, “and thus for members of political parties and for candidates in their campaigns and for other groups who support them” (p. 215). Public reason, thus, “not only governs the public discourse of elections insofar as the issues involve those fundamental questions, but also how citizens are to cast their vote on these questions” (p. 215). Furthermore, it applies in official forums such as when legislators speak on the floor of a parliament, and to the executive, it also applies “in a special way to the judiciary and above all to a supreme court in a constitutional democracy with judicial review” (p. 216).
The idea is that, for fundamental questions that affect everyone broadly, citizens need to use public reason and not their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, because, as has already been stated, the exercise of democratic power, the power of the public, is always coercive (p. 216). A public reason is critical for those wielding power because it would be grossly anti-democratic to try and use everyone’s public and coercive power to advance a specific reasonable comprehensive doctrine: “There is no reason why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have the right to use state power to decide constitutional essentials as that person’s, or that association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs” (p. 226). It would be a dire mistake.

Just like how an overlapping consensus, or a constitutional consensus, is constructed from within, not against, reasonable comprehensive doctrines of a society, so too is public reason, because “[c]itizens affirm the ideal of public reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doctrines” (p. 218). By extension, it seems that public reason is only possible in a constitutional or an overlapping consensus. It does not exist in a modus vivendi because there is no consensus whatsoever, however slim, to base a completely public reason of off: “on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice, the basic structure and its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens, as the principle of political legitimacy requires…we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines” when discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice (p. 224-225).

To inaugurate a true democracy, Rawls argues that there need to be constitutional essentials that ought to be reached, such as fundamental principles outlining the political process, the legislature and the executive and judiciary rule, equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities need to respect, “such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of though and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law” (p. 227). That these are founded fairly and well is critical for maintaining of peace and order, and perhaps good government, because with them, “willing political and social cooperation between free and equal citizens can normally be maintained” (p. 230).

Rawls clarifies that the reason of the courts is public reason (p. 231). The courts, especially the Supreme Court, expound the reason of the people. Thus, it follows that “[b]y applying public reason the court is to prevent that law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or more likely, by organized and well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way (p. 233). Rawls, to see if something posits the following test to see if something is following public reason or not: “how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion? Reasonable? Outrageous?” (p. 254). With a firm grip of the relevant Rawlsian political theory, it now makes sense to ask, who is the Muslim Brotherhood?
CHAPTER 3: WHO ARE THE MYSTERIOUS MUSLIM BROTHERS?

The rise to power in 2011 starts in 1928, when the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, a “flagship organization of Sunni revivalist Islam [that] has been in existence longer than any other contemporary Islamist group in the Arab world” (Wickham 2013, p. 20). Although native to Egypt, it has affiliates or chapters spanning the Arab world (p. 21), but here the focus will rest on the foundational Egyptian wing. Wickham writes that “[a]t the time of its formation, the Brotherhood was just one of several religious societies seeking to reinforce popular adherence to Islam and combat the threat posed by the spread of Western cultural values and lifestyles in a context of rapid social and political change” (p. 21-22). Although this could be read in a sense as anti-western, it makes more sense as an anti-colonial sentiment, Egypt having been colonized by the British. Furthermore, and critically, the Brotherhood, since its genesis, has supported the fusion of church and state, as they espouse “a vision of Islam as *din wa dawla* (religion and state), that is, not only a guide to private belief and ritual but a comprehensive system of values and governance intrinsically different from – and superior to – the secular political systems of the West” (p. 23). Yet, one may become confused in trying to analyze or categorize their political thought (even *din wa dawla* will be contradicted later, as some claim only the Prophet Muhammad can fuse the two). Wickham writes that the early Egyptian Brothers “never offered a detailed and coherent vision of the Islamic order it sought to create. In part, this stemmed from the group’s emphasis on ‘action’ (*’amal*) and ‘organization’ (*tandhiim*) over ‘ideology’ (*fikra*), as well as perhaps a sense that any efforts to work out the details at such a preliminary stage were premature” (p. 24).

If only one word were to be used to describe the Muslim Brotherhood, it would be anomalous. They are indeed an anomaly. Their long and strained history is much too long to recount here, only the context of the more modern era will be provided. While interesting, their history displays an organization going many different directions, and so the immediately pre-Arab Spring Brothers and their relevant thought and actions, before, during and after the election, will be most important. Throughout time the Muslim Brotherhood has changed its role, status, and methods a plethora of times, from vengeful to non-violent, from practically fundamentalist to practically liberal, from banned to free, from political party to charity group, and everything in-between, arguably why they were so successful in the 2011 elections, having been so entrenched in the Egyptian cultural fabric for 83 years. Perhaps the zeitgeist, the very essence of the Brotherhood, is best captured by al-Banna himself, even as he refused to “pigeonhole” the group:

Brethren, you are not a benevolent organization, nor a political party, nor a local association with strictly limited aims. Rather you are a new spirit making its way into the heart of this nation and revivifying it through the Quran: a new light dawning and scattering the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of God; a resounding voice rising and echoing the message of the Prophet (p. 24).
What is important, if one were to try to condense this storied history, is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a group trying to reform Egypt socially and politically with an Islamic focus. There exist many tensions in the group, including if, and if so, how to, to implement Sharia law and the fight between secular and divine power: “[there] was the tension between the ultimate authority of God as expressed by the Shari’a and the authority of the nation’s elected representatives in parliament or local councils to enact laws in accordance with the popular will. How – and by whom – should the conformity of human-made legislation with the principles of Sharia be ensured” (p. 24-25). Also, how about their treatment of those not in agreement with them, such as Christians or others, like women in general? The group lacks clarity over time, but their actions in, around and after the Arab Spring are more relevant, especially what they actually did while in power, because actions always speak louder than words, and as what they did while in government matters more than campaign promises.

As soon as the Arab Spring protests started, concern was already expressed that the Muslim Brotherhood was going to “dominate the new political order or to push for the immediate application of Shari’a provisions at odds with the uprising’s democratic spirit” (p. 154), or alternatively, the oft-repeated sentiment that the Brothers would or did hijack the Arab Spring. Due to its influence, the Muslim Brotherhood was invited to an eight-member committee to reform the constitution immediately after overthrown of the Mubarak regime (p. 170).

Now that an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s origins has been laid out, any other relevant questions of “who” will be answered in the next chapter, which looks at the history from the Arab Spring to the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood government. As the pertinent historical record is recalled, a better picture of the mysterious Muslim Brotherhood will crystalize once their statements and actions are studied.

CHAPTER 4: BREAD, FREEDOM, AND JUSTICE.

The story of Egypt’s risen and fallen democracy starts in Tunisia, with what is now called the Arab Spring. On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian man named Mohamed Bouazizi committed self-immolation (Gana 2013, p. 3), starting a revolution that would cross boarders and reach to every corner of the Arab world. The democratic surge, largely by youth, reached from Tunisia to Egypt to Syria. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest of the dictatorships that lorded over them, leading to four regime changes in Gaddafi’s Libya, Mubarak’s Egypt, Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Saleh’s Yemen (Amar and Prashad 2013) – and a Middle East that will never be the same.

A month after Bouazizi’s martyrdom, the protests spread to Egypt as “[m]illions of citizens flooded Cairo’s central Tahrir Square starting on January 25” (Amar 2013, p. 25) to protest the 30 year
dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. What seemed unimaginable just two months prior now was a reality, and protestors refused to be deterred – they wanted change. Canadian foreign correspondent Nahlah Ayed witnessed and reported on the Egyptian revolutions three days (Ayed 2012, p. 289) after they started. She illustrates the causes of the revolutions, soon to be summed up in a simple yet powerful chant, “‘Bread, freedom and justice.’ They kept it up event when the retort came in the form of bullets…As much as this rebellion was about freedom and human rights, it was equally about the tattered economy, and about the millions of educated youth who could find no work and had poor prospects of marriage as a result” (p. 290). The citizens knew what they wanted, regime change after living in an “official state of emergency since 1981” (p. 280).

After a month of sustained clashes and protests, the thirty year regime fell as the military - whose “generals were remaining neutral, watching to see if Mubarak and his central security forces could manage the situation” (Rutherford 2013, p. 43) on the 25th – let the regime fall as “an army officer appeared on state television, promising that the military would end the emergency law, preside over reforms, and hold free and fair presidential elections. The army, Egypt’s most important power broker, had sacrificed Mubarak to retain its privileged position and long-time hold on Egypt” (Ayed, p. 307). The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military’s official title, took power until the elections that were held in 2011 and 2012: “[t]he military had decided to jettison its patron of thirty years and take the reins of power itself” (Rutherford, p. 43).

An essential point to make here is that these protests were not Islamic. As Ayed reports, “the Islamists – long considered the region’s feared rebels – had been caught flat-footed by the uprising; they were a small, belated player in the upswell of youthful disenchantment. This was no Muslim Brotherhood event, no Islamist revolt” (Ayed, p. 304). Although the protests were not theirs, the upcoming elections soon would be. The Brothers, due to their long history and their participation in pre-Arab Spring (sham) elections, were much more organized politically and more mobile electorally than the liberal protestors that had dominated the streets.

What follows is a summary of the post-Arab Spring events that are applicable to answering the research questions later on. These events start with the elections and end with the fall of the Morsi government, as this is the scope of this thesis.

Firstly, to run in the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood founded a political party named the “Freedom and Justice Party” (Amar, p. 57).

The result of the January 21, 2012 parliamentary elections was 70 per cent of the seats going to Islamists, 47 per cent of them to “a political coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood” and 25 per cent by an “alliance of ultraconservative Islamists,” known as the Salafists (Kirkpatrick, Jan 21, 2012). The voter turnout was 62.04 per cent of the voting age population (“Voter turnout data for Egypt,”
International IDEA). Only a couple of seats went to a “coalition of parties founded by the young leaders of the revolt that unseated Mr. Mubarak won only a few percent of the seats” (Kirkpatrick, Jan 21, 2012). Lastly, “[a]mong the remaining roughly 30 percent of parliamentary seats, the next largest share was won by the Wafd Party, a liberal party recognized under Mr. Mubarak and with roots dating to Egypt’s colonial period” (Kirkpatrick, Jan 21, 2012).

Mohamed Morsi, on June 24, 2012, became president “as the winner of Egypt’s first competitive presidential election, handing the Islamists both a symbolic triumph and a potent weapon in their struggle for power against the country’s top generals” winning 51.7 percent of the runoff votes (Kirkpatrick, June 24, 2012). As one can see, this power struggle existed since day one, actually even before Morsi took office, because “[t]wo weeks before June 30, [the military’s] promised date to hand over power, the generals instead shut down the democratically elected and Islamist-led Parliament; took over its powers to make laws and set budgets; decreed an interim Constitution stripping the president of most of his powers; and reimposed martial law by authorizing soldiers to arrest civilians. In the process, the generals gave themselves, in effect, a veto over provisions of a planned permanent Constitution” (Kirkpatrick, June 24, 2012). A White House statement “urged the generals to speed the transition to democracy and recalled Mr. Morsi’s pledges of inclusiveness: ‘We believe in the importance of the new Egyptian government upholding universal values, and respecting the rights of all Egyptian citizens – including women and religious minorities such as Coptic Christians.’” The Coptic Church also congratulated Morsi, “calling the election a victory for democracy” (Kirkpatrick, June 24, 2012).

Not a month after, a New York Times headline screamed that “Egypt’s Military and President Escalate Their Power Struggle,” as “Egypt’s highest court and its most senior generals on Monday dismissed President Mohamed Morsi’s order to restore the dissolved Parliament as an affront to the rule of law, escalating a raw contest for supremacy between the competing camps.” This power struggle illustrated a war dance in the new democracy, between the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood and the firmly entrenched military: “The generals, backed by the court, argue that the new president must respect legal precedents and the institutions of the state. The new president, in turn, is calling on the generals to respect a popular will that was expressed through free elections” (Fahim, July 9, 2012). Important to recall at this point is that “Parliament’s ability to pass laws is already in doubt, given the court ruling that led to its dissolution.” Fahim summarizes it thus, writing that “in many ways the court and the president are proxies for a fight between the nation’s oldest and most influential Islamist organization and appointees of the ousted president, Hosni Mubarak” (Fahim, July 9, 2012).

The next important issue to focus on was the constitutional rounds that resulted in a new Egyptian constitution. Firstly, and most concerning, was the ambiguous role of religion (Islam), as the assembly drafting a new constitution came to a compromise that “would insert religion more deeply into the
legislative and judicial process by elaborating new guidelines to interpret ‘principles of Islamic law,’ that the old Constitution had recognized, at least nominally, as the main source of Egyptian legislation” (Kirkpatrick, Nov. 9, 2012). Yet, the new constitution would also “leave the final authority to apply those principles with the elected Parliament and civil courts, making the long-term consequences hard to foresee.” Two points to quickly make here include that “In Tunisia, the site of the first uprising, the dominant Islamist party has already agreed on a more liberal compromise, retaining a clause in its Constitution declaring that Islam is the state religion but omitting any reference to Islamic law,” and that Egypt would have been “the first Arab state to seek to meld democracy with the principles of Islamic law” (Kirkpatrick, Nov. 9, 2012).

Morsi later balked, at least a little bit, on his attempt “to assert an authority beyond the reach of any court” (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, Nov. 26, 2012). His rationale was that “his purpose was to empower himself to prevent judges appointed by former President Hosni Mubarak from dissolving the constituent assembly, which is led by his fellow Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.” The court had already dissolved an earlier assembly and were expected to do so again (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, Nov. 26, 2012).

Most critically, in a Rawlsian framework, for Egyptian democracy and for the questions to be answered here, Morsi’s moves on the Constitution sparked both democratic furor and potentially his downfall. “[T]ens of thousands” of protestors filled Tahrir square “denouncing Egypt’s president, Mohamed Morsi, and the hasty passage earlier in the day of a draft constitution written by an Islamist assembly.” Essentially, the Islamists in the Constitutional Assembly were pressed by Morsi to pass a draft constitution “hastily, despite a walkout by non-Islamists, have provided the opposition with a rallying cry” (Fahim, Nov. 30, 2012). Not only did Morsi try to put himself out of the courts’ reach, he also encouraged the passing of a constitution through a majoritarian method, rather than seeking any consensus on such an important document, indeed a foundational document that could have been the basis for a solid Egyptian democracy for years to come.

As protests against the Morsi government and Morsi gained momentum, the actions of Morsi became more erratic. He seemed to be losing control, and was not acting as his formerly calm self. For example, as the number of those filing into Tahrir Square swelled, the first ever-elected President of Egypt used a tactic familiar to his predecessor: “[he] blamed an outbreak of violence on a ‘fifth column’ and vowed to proceed with a referendum on an Islamist-backed constitution that has prompted deadly street battles between his supporters and their opponents” (Kirkpatrick, Dec. 6 2012). Rather than taking the higher road and aiming for consensus (the protests having been caused by Morsi’s actions), Morsi resorted to tactics to rally his base as the referendum approached. This constitution eventually passed a popular referendum by the people, being approved by a majority of 4.5 million votes of out of 16.2
million cast (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, Dec. 23, 2012). Although it passed, it also inspired more and more protests. Only after the constitution passed did Morsi admit that he made mistakes in forcing through the document, calling the fierce disagreements a “‘healthy phenomenon’” of democracy and “[a]ppealing for unity after the bitter debate over the charter, which was finalized by his Islamist allies over the objections of opposition parties and the Coptic Christian Church” (Kirkpatrick, Dec. 26, 2012). The Supreme Court accepted the document, also accepting its own “reconstruction under the new charter, which removed several of the most recently appointed judges. The reduction in its size effectively purged certain judges, including some who were Mubarak loyalists” (Kirkpatrick, Dec. 26, 2012). The Brotherhood hoped that the new constitution would finally let them govern without outside interference.

Yet, the Brotherhood soon discovered intense political gridlock as soon as a month later because “Morsi still appears to exercise little day-to-day authority over the judiciary, the police, the military and the state-run news media… a vivid reminder that their political victories have not yet translated into real power over the Egyptian bureaucracy” (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, Jan. 19, 2013). After all the divineness, after all the power grabbing, after all the alienation and protest, the expected results were not conferred. It almost seemed like not much had changed except the depth of discontent in a year. Indeed, exactly two years after the initial protests that cast the Mubarak regime to the wayside, “[v]iolence erupted across Egypt on [Jan. 25, 2013] as tens of thousands of demonstrators filled Tahrir Square to mark the second anniversary of the country’s revolution with an outpouring of rage against the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Total political ineffectiveness and vast unpopularity led Morsi to another misstep, at least in hindsight, as the increasingly unpopular leader declared a state of emergency in Suez, Ismailia and Port Said. The state of emergency was, of course, a tool of oppression wielded by Mubarak that the Egyptian people lived under for 30 years (Kirkpatrick, Jan. 27, 2013). Indeed, the state of emergency was the distinguishing birthmark, or scar, of the former regime, so it obviously was ironic that the first democratically elected Egyptian President employed this totalitarian method.

Order in Egypt was rapidly falling apart, and protestors on March 9, 2013 started even calling for a military coup, heralding back the only stable organization in the country but also the one that allowed dictatorship to live on. Public security was a concern as protests multiplied and violence escalated: “[a]lthough such calls are hardly universal and there is no threat of an imminent coup, the growing murmurs that military intervention may be the only solution to the collapse of public security can be heard around the country, especially in circles opposed to the Islamists who have dominated post-Mubarak elections” (Kirkpatrick & Fahim, March 9, 2013).

Finally, the story comes to a close on July 3rd, 2013 (Kirkpatrick, July 3, 2013) as a military coup d’état killed democracy – however flawed, however infantile – in its inception. Tens of thousands cheered the fall of the Morsi government and rule of the people, favoring the stability a military dictatorship
offered, and understandably so, as the country’s experiment in democracy sparked off unrest and instability the likes of the country had not seen in decades.

CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO ANSWER THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This chapter, the last before the conclusion, embarks to answer the research question(s) of this thesis. As a refresher, they are: why did democracy in Egypt falter? What was missing that could have guaranteed success, or what were elements that led to its failure? What went wrong? Another needed reminder is the original hypothesis composed before research started: the Muslim Brotherhood government fell because that government inspired in various ways unrest amongst the Egyptian population, and this popular unrest was coupled with a strong military overthrowing the government. The factor shared in common here is that the military seemed to ironically wait until popular unrest, a healthy democratic expression, was at a fever pitch to exploit rather than preemptively carrying out a coup d'état.

Using the Rawlsian framework that has been established and an understanding of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the relevant history to Egyptian democracy, this chapter will focus on applying Rawls to the overarching situation, analyzing what could have been done differently, Morsi and his government, the military, Egypt’s cultural composition, comparative cases, and, from all of this, ultimately trying to determine why democracy was so short lived.

As Rawls explains, a modern democratic society (and sometimes dictatorships, as Egypt shows) is made of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines that may be incompatible and not affirmed by all. Egypt, today and then, is a multicultural society with a population that holds a wide spectrum of political beliefs, from Salafism to liberalism, and it is also “the most populous country in the Middle East, with a population of ninety-one million mostly speaking Arabic” (Amar, p. 27). Furthermore, this large country has approximately 6-10 percent of the population made of Coptic Christians (the Coptic Church is the historic indigenous Orthodox Church in Egypt). And as the twenty-first century began, Egypt still featured a multicultural society comprising a variety of other religious groupings, ethnic identities, and sects, including Nubians, Baha’is, Armenians, Sudanese, Somalians, Bedouins, Roma (“Gypsies”), Amazigh (“Berbers” in Siwa), and hundreds of thousands of international residents from China, Korea, India, Russia, Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Persian Gulf, the United States, and the Levant. (Amar, p. 27)

Thus, one can see Rawls’ point about the diversity of society. Right away, it is obvious that the very core of the protests against the Morsi government that brought it down were inspired by threats to those protestors’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The forceful passing of an Islamic constitution immediately set off concerns that this constitution paved the way to a theocracy- the road to Afghanistan,
as some dubbed it. There are two Rawlsian points to elaborate on here: a modus vivendi and the original position.

Before that, some basic mistakes that were made need to be pointed out. For example, Rawls theorizes that “reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though different from their own” (Rawls, p. 60). It is obvious that the Brothers made this elementary error during their tenure. There needs to be a collaboration and consensus, because for Rawls, “no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime” (p. 135).

Also, although one would expect the courts to use the public reason elaborated here, in the same breath it is worth remembering that a public reason does not exist in a modus vivendi. Public reason was lacking in Egypt – every political entity, from the Brothers to the Military to the Courts seemed to be acting only in their own interest, hence the discontent of Egyptians. To be fair, as aforementioned in chapter two, public reasons does not seem to exist in a modus vivendi. But, the governing Muslim Brothers could have considered public reason while drafting their constitution.

Turning back to Rawls’ fundamental ideas, the modus vivendi and the original position, it is fair to say that a modus vivendi was established during the elections. Although some groups, especially the young liberals who did not mobilize quickly enough, felt cheated, overall the elections were fair and seemingly accepted by the whole of Egyptian society. Indeed, as aforementioned, the Coptic Church congratulated Morsi on his win. Obviously not an overlapping consensus, and not a constitutional consensus as it still had to be drafted, this conception was a modus vivendi. As time passed it seems that this modus vivendi fell apart as the behavior of the Morsi government became more and more authoritarian. They saw an election as a license for a four-year dictatorship, as they did not even seem to try and compromise on the constitution, which was rammed through despite the protest and exit of the other legislators. Although the constitution passed a popular referendum with a large majority, Morsi and his government could and should have been much more responsible to ensure that all Egyptian voices were involved in the drafting of the constitution. Morsi threw away a chance to develop, even if initially narrow, a constitutional consensus. As he took more unilateral measures, his modus vivendi started to slip out of reach. Electoral participation also declined, indicating a more and more jaundiced population as 62.04 per cent of Egyptians voted in the 2012 Parliamentary election, 51.85 per cent in the 2012 Presidential election (“Voter turnout data for Egypt,” International IDEA), and 30 per cent for the constitutional referendum (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, Dec. 23, 2012). For some this “signaled to many that the early parliamentary vote had been a vote against the old regime rather than for the Islamists” (Amar, p.47). Alternatively, this could indicate resentfulness as well.
It is of course reasonable for the citizens of Egypt to express their discontent. In fact, as democratic citizens it was their right and it is admirable that they did so and so often, a breath of fresh air as compared to the apathy that characterized the Mubarak years. Is this not what the Arab Spring was about? Furthermore, using the logic of the original position, there is hardly a chance that, all other things being equal (which they certainly were not), that this type of constitution would not have made it to referendum. Rather, a political conception constructed by Egyptian citizens in the original position would have brought forward a much more egalitarian constitution that drew inspiration from all Egyptian comprehensive doctrines to construct a consensus rather than a simple majoritarian constitution. Rather being remembered as has-beens that failed politically, the Muslim Brotherhood had a real chance, and some would say a duty as the first elected government, to build up a sustainable democratic model that could have led Egypt into years of democratic rule, which, as Rawls argues, if constructed well, would only get stronger with each passing year, even if this meant the Brothers might lose power in an upcoming election. Although no government ever wants to lose power, that scenario seems much better than reality had the Brothers actually tried to build up the political system.

This is all nice, almost flowery, but political comprise did not mean much for the Muslim Brotherhood government as a Damoclean Sword named the Egyptian military hung over their heads. Were Morsi to consult Political Liberalism for advice on how to stop the military from pestering, and eventually overthrowing, his rule, he would be out of luck. One other conceptual problem with this political theory is that Rawls’ work seems to imagine a democracy that starts from scratch, and not as a field guide to establish democracy. Thus, his theory does not account for problems such as the residual power of Mubarak appointed judges during Morsi’s tenure.

Indeed, in trying to grab more power, it could also be seen that the Morsi government was trying to protect democratic government in their war dance, a battle that started with the two elections, with the military and what they thought might be their inevitably overthrow. If one analyzes the desperate actions of Morsi in this lens, it almost seems he was trying to put power out of arms’ reach of the military. Not only did he fail at this, but also, he, through his power grabbing, inspired democratic protest. This was a healthy and positive expression by the Egyptian people against a government that was not acting democratic, not fulfilling their mandate. More than not carrying out their duties, their rule was ineffective, causing more protests, which led to instability, and soon, the Egyptian public associated Morsi with former dictator Mubarak, even some calling for the military to take power to restore order, which they did, dropping the guillotine on democracy’s head.

One can understand why the people called for the military amidst the protests and the largely unpopular Morsi government. This military was one of the only constants in Egyptian society over the decades, and arguably, the strong military is not only a regional power player but it also may be the
reason why today Egypt does not look like other Arab Spring countries either divided like Libya or overrun with Islamic extremists like ISIS in Syria. This comparative analysis shows that the military helps hold the fabric of Egyptian society together (thus its hesitancy to give up power completely to the democratic rule of Morsi) against these sorts of threats. ISIS, as powerful as they seem, would not stand up to the Egyptian war machine. Although they may serve this important role, there is no reason why they could not perform it under democratic circumstances.

So it is obviously ironic that the same people who protested for bread, freedom and justice against the Mubarak regime were now calling for a power seizure by the exact same military that propped up Mubarak for 30 years. How come the military did not, and has not, established democracy? How come they, instead of carrying out a coup d’état, did not calm the people while promoting democracy? It seems it was not in their best interest. As this writer wrote in the Carillon in a debate over the sincerity of the coup towards democracy, “[i]f the military was in such favour of democracy, then why are they actively trying to shut down the Muslim Brotherhood after Morsi had been thrown out of office? Spiritual leaders have been arrested, Brotherhood members are being discriminated against. To me, it seems the military, if it so chooses to have one, is trying to heavily destroy the chances of the Brotherhood to even run in the next election. In a rule by the people, it should be the people deciding the chances of a political organization in an election, not the military. They are currently charging Morsi with the killing of opponents protesting outside his palace while in office” (Chmielewski, Sept. 6, 2013). Almost two years later the answer is obvious, as Mohammed Morsi’s trial is set to start in May 2015, a trial “that could potentially result in his execution as Egypt continues to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood” (Garofalo, March 25, 2015).

If anyone is skeptical that the military is this opportunistic and Machiavellian, why would they remain neutral during the Arab Spring, although eventually letting the Mubarak regime fall (could they not have done that before in the last three decades, if they were looking out for democracy?) During the coup d’état against Morsi, the generals promised to stay out of politics: “[t]he generals built their case for intervention in a carefully orchestrated series of maneuvers, calling their actions an effort at a ‘national reconciliation’ and refusing to call their takeover a coup. At a televised news conference late on Wednesday night, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi said that the military had no interest in politics and was ousting Mr. Morsi because he had failed to fulfill ‘the hope for a national consensus.’” (Kirkpatrick, July 3, 2013). Using what is almost Rawlsian language, it disguises their true motives, and for it must surely be a coincidence that el-Sisi currently rules Egypt. Surely, el-Sisi is working towards the consensus; the use of Rawlsian language only heightens the irony.

What is the role of religion and politics in Egyptian society? The Muslim Brotherhood, through their actions, wanted to make Egypt a state under Islam. This desire – or pathology- to make Egypt more
Islamic is rooted in both their genesis and their siege mentality produced by having been banned for so long. They saw making Egypt Islamic not only their duty, but also a way of protecting their faith.

The separation of church and state is easily the best way to protect all religious faiths in a state. A secular state cannot be oversold, because if no religion is able to use the state’s, and the people’s, coercive power over the entire polity, not only are all religions protected, they indeed flourish. As John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge point out in *God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is Changing the World* the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” essentially the U.S. became a free market of religion, where anybody could buy in, using market terminology: the First Amendment became “the great engine of American religiosity, creating a new sort of country where membership in a church was a purely voluntary activity”(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2010, p. 21). The authors argue that it was this clause that led to American religiosity. The two separated allows for the two to coexist peacefully. Since the overthrow of Morsi, Egyptians have actually lost their appetite for Islam and democracy as “[a]bout half of Egyptians (48%) agree that laws should strictly follow the teaching of the Quran. While this still represents the plurality opinion in Egypt, agreement with this principle is down 10 percentage points since 2013 and 14 points since 2011. Around a third (31%) say laws should follow the values and principles of Islam, but not strictly follow the Quran. Only 16% say that laws should not be influenced by the teachings of the Quran. However this is a significantly more common viewpoint today than three years ago,” according to the Pew Research Center. Furthermore, “those who oppose the July 2013 overthrow of the Morsi government are more likely to support a strict interpretation of Islam for their laws (55%) than those who favored the overthrow (45%)” (Pew Research Center 2014).

From an Islamic perspective this becomes more complicated because the interpretation and application of Sharia law is theological perplexing. For example, one senior Muslim Brotherhood member argued “against the formation of a Brotherhood party on principle… [he argued that] no one but the Prophet Muhammad had the right to fuse religious and political authority”(Wickham, p.175). This was a minority view was rare, judging by both the Islamic assembly’s actions and the referendum supporting the constitution.

No matter what the Brothers had done with religion and the state, they would have been criticized, on one side by liberals wishing for separation, on the other by ultraconservative Salafists: “While liberals in the assembly argued that they had beaten back Salafi proposals for a council of religious scholars that could strike down legislation, many activists outside were angry that the constitution appeared for the first time to take Shariah so seriously. ‘The road to Afghanistan, said Malek Adly, a liberal activist” (Kirkpatrick, Nov. 9, 2012).
Democracy in Egypt almost seemed doomed from the start. The optimism that characterized the Arab Spring seemed misplaced as only one of these countries is currently a democracy. Upon reflection, democracy may have seemed improbable. Not only did governments like Syria’s fight their citizens, and other countries became failed states like Libya, but strife between reasonable comprehensive doctrines seemed irreparable. Even a modus vivendi did not last in relatively stable Egypt. Optimism has been replaced by pessimism. Yet one must not forget the original democratic surge, that desire for justice across boarders, that those nations deserve. There is no relativism on this point; democracy is the best form of government. It is only a matter of getting to this ideal system of government. Although it is easy to be defeatist, and although there are comparative cases of failure i.e. Libya and Syria, there are also comparative cases of success. Firstly, Tunisia. Not only does Tunisia dispel the myth that Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive, as they agreed on a liberal compromise (and now, the country can move onto a constitutional consensus), the country is also an argument against the defeatist sense that democracy cannot come to the region. Sadly, it is the only success story derived from a young man’s brave self-immolation and all the sacrifice of thousands that followed his example. Furthermore, Egypt’s role and their size in the region make it an unfair comparison with the much smaller Tunisia. Still, it is a glimmer of hope.

Secondly, another case that provides optimism for democracy in Egypt is India. Not only does India have a larger population – indeed the largest democracy in the world – but it is an extraordinarily multicultural society with a plethora of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are sometimes diametrically opposed to each other, along with the plagues of religious strife and poverty. Yet, it is also a successful democracy election after election. Although there is no space to list all the details of Indian society here, surely if that polity, with all its inner differences, can function democratically, so can Egypt. India is not a Middle Eastern country, granted, but there are similarities that confer some hope for rule by the people.

To answer the questions, democracy in Egypt failed because not only did an opportunistic military take advantage of democratic expression and protest at its fever pitch, but that democratic expression was caused by a government that refused to find consensus and rather than alleviating tension, they stoked the fires of division and cynicism with many costly missteps in an explosive political minefield. The government’s political solutions and policy were the equivalent of using a Band-Aid to try and cure gangrene; their solutions were shortsighted and ended up costing them power.

Thus, both are equally to blame. Had the Morsi government not made so many mistakes, when they should have focused on consensus politics for the future, they might not only have saved their government, their goal all along, but democracy for all Egyptians. The military of course shares culpability, as they were waiting for the Morsi government to misstep from the beginning. They also lied
through their teeth during the coup, saying they were not interested in politics. For their faults, they have maintained relative stability – even if it meant a coup – in Egyptian society, a rare feat in the Middle East that deserves credit.

Thus, having not considered it fully before, the Rawlsian analysis set forth here shows that they hypothesis was largely right but could have been more specific in placing more onus on the Muslim Brotherhood.

No political party, or political actor like the military or the courts, actively took the Arab Spring and its zeitgeist, its sprit, and translated it into tangible political rule. The closest that the protestors came to the democracy they strove for probably occurred in Tahrir Square during the original protests, as Nahlah Ayed recounts the progressive nature: “The citizens of the ‘New Egypt’ were poignantly inclusive: Christians prayed in the open air while Muslims kept watch for threats. Muslims then prayed while Christians watched their backs… They chanted against violence, against destruction of public property. ‘He who loves Egypt won’t destroy it,’ they sang. Every once in a while, they erupted in a ‘Peaceful, peaceful, peaceful,’” a reminder this was a people’s uprising, civilian and unarmed, and would remain so despite what had come before”(Ayed, 303).

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps not advisable to end a thesis on a melancholic note, but here the subject matter justifies it. In setting to find out why democracy in Egypt failed, it seems now that the country is nowhere nearer to rule by its people than was in 2011, or even when Mubarak took over, or even when the British left their colony. Yet, although pessimism reigns supreme concerning democracy in the Middle East and Egypt, what the Arab Spring proved was that there is a pulse, a desire for self-government. As confusing, as chaotic, and as calamitous as democracy’s short stint was in Egypt, it is better that the people rose up and tried to seize what they unabashedly deserve after centuries of authoritarianism rather than laying dormant even longer.

Melancholy for what could have been had mistakes been avoided; but cheerfulness for the hope that this historical example confers. Again, democracy showed some vital signs in a region that many deem inhospitable to self-rule. This is a patronizing stance as the odds against democracy in both Egypt and the Middle East were stacked. Yet, if democracy were easy to achieve, this thesis would not exist. Democracy has fought larger goliaths in the past, including both fascism and communism in the previous, and bloodiest, century of human history, and emerged victorious. The battle is not over yet, a lot of challenges lay ahead, but the clearest source of confidence in democracy’s chances is that a month before the Arab Spring, there was absolutely no indication that a democratic surge was about to explode. A desire exists; the only question now is when.
Reference List


Garofalo, Alex. (March 25, 2015). *Ex-President Mohamed Morsi to Stand Trial for Insulting Judiciary; Egypt Continues Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood*. International Business Times.


The evolutionary adaptations of the human biological and cognitive system have developed a great capacity for dealing with change. This allows our species to thrive in a social environment where we encounter very diverse requirements in our day to day lives. Human problem solving skills have adapted to this environment of diversity quite spectacularly, and many systems and structures to deal with or implement changes have been establish. However, the way problems are identified and managed may lead to long-term complications when certain types of problems are ignored or misidentified. Following the established systems of dealing with changing conditions and unexpected outcomes may not always address the relevant issues brought about by change. One of the reasons for this is the belief that the systems for dealing with change may be applied to all types of change (Grint, 2008).

With the prominence of globalization and increased access to information, the rate of change is becoming faster and the scope of problems reach further, affecting diverse groups of people. This presents issues in keeping up with the times and adapting to current trends or fads. As creatures of evolution, humans have developed systems more adept at dealing with immediate issues. For example, the autonomic nervous system is designed to quickly activate the body in a flight or fight response to perceived danger, an immediate response designed for survival in life-threatening situations. Immediate dangers are less common in modern society, however the natural human tendency is still geared towards solving immediate problems and gaining short-term rewards. Because of this, gradual changes may not be easily identified and the development problems that do not appear to have immediate consequences often go unaddressed. Al Gore (David, Burns, & Bender, 2006) had a very good analogy for this in his movie “An Inconvenient Truth” when he described how a frog that was dropped into a pot of hot water would immediately try and escape the uncomfortable heat, but a frog that was set in a pot of room temperature water that was slowly heated would not realize the temperature had gotten too hot until it was too late. In a similar way, humanity struggles to acknowledge gradual changes, especially when they do not appear to require immediate attention to avoid a crisis. An obvious example of this is the issue of global warming.

Different kinds of change can produce different kinds of problems: Tame, Wicked, and Critical (Grint, 2008). Tame problems are recurring problems with known solutions that can be achieved by implementing standard tested and true procedures. Wicked problems are tricky, coming not from a single source, but from many sources. They are novel problems without known solution and often can not be resolved procedurally. Wicked problems cross the boundaries of several different institutions (eg. politics, economics, healthcare) and cultures (eg. global implications) and require asking questions, engaging the
Critical problems are problems with imminent and often dire consequences that demand to be addressed before incurring serious detrimental effects.

For this article I would like to distinguish between two types of Crises. “Short-term Crises” are immediate and unexpected changes that require immediate action to avoid or limit potentially devastating outcomes. An example of a Short-term Crisis is the outbreak of Ebola. “Long-term Crises” (Wicked Crises) are an accumulation of problems that result from gradual changes over time. Gradual changes can produce a series of small problems. Each problem may be dealt with as a Tame problem, but the aggregate result of too many unaddressed Tame problems produce a resultant Wicked problem that can manifest as a potential existential crisis. Not all Wicked problems are crises. Wicked problems can refer to the problem of passing a law about oil production, something that is not necessarily an imminent threat to human existence or well being. Legal implications about a law dealing with oil production play a role in a yet larger Wicked problem of global warming. Global warming is an example of a Long-term Crisis because it does present a threat to human existence and must be dealt with as such. What defines global warming as a Long-term Crisis is that it lacks the urgent nature that demands immediate action. The most extreme consequences of global warming are still decades away from occurring and therefore global warming, although it is a crisis, is easily dismissed by leaders who are more concerned about immediate problems.

In this article I will focus on these Long-term Crises and what type of leadership is required in the future to adequately identify and deal with these types of problems. I believe that it will become more imperative in the ensuing years to establish leaders with the capacity to unify people on a global scale to deal with long-term issues before we reach a critical point, after which it will become much more difficult to find solutions to these types of problems. Some challenges this presents is how exactly to identify and approach problems, how to unify a vast and diverse group of people, and what traits are best for leaders in positions of high stress such as crisis situations.

Review

One of the biggest impediments to dealing with problems that arise from change is that it is often difficult to identify the problem. This could be the result of framing situations in a way that does not suggest that the change will present any problem. Framing refers to how a situation is presented as producing either a loss or a gain (Tversky & Khaneman, 1981). To fix this, a leader would have to reframe the situation and present it to the public in a way that revealed it to be problematic (Grint, 2008). Only then could the problem be addressed in an appropriate manner. Changing the way in which the problem is perceived changes the options for dealing with it.
Framing plays an important role in identifying what type of problem is being encountered. Often, problems that at first appear to be Tame problems turn out to belong to a larger network of related problems that constitute a Wicked problem. This may be the result of failing to deal with a Tame problem before it manifests into something larger (Fairhurst, 2005). Identifying a problem as Tame, Wicked, or Critical is important because each different type of problem should be dealt with differently (Grint, 2008). Tame problems can be solved by following previously established standard procedures since Tame problems are singular in nature and may be isolated and dealt with easily. Critical problems, due to their urgent nature, are best dealt with through firm and assertive decision making. Decisions may not necessarily be right or wrong, so long as some action is being taken to counteract the immediate crisis. Wicked problems present more of an issue, however, because they cannot be isolated from the context in which they are found. Wicked problems need to be thoroughly analyzed in order to determine the root cause of an issue, or to determine what systems are contributing to the issue and what the best course of action is. This involves taking time to ask questions and contemplate the variety of approaches and outcomes.

If Long-term Crises are a type of Wicked problem, then the issue becomes how to apply this inquisitive approach to problem solving while incorporating a sense of urgency. Grint (2008) provides a good example of what happens when this strategy is ignored. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Bush administration had the opportunity to ask important questions about the established safety measures in New Orleans meant to keep people safe in the event of a hurricane. They failed to seriously consider questions such as “what if the levies don’t hold” and “what if the safety dome cannot withstand the storm” and the consequences were that many people lost their lives because all of the possible approaches and outcomes had not been appropriately considered. When looking at corporations that made it through the financial crisis of 2007, three key themes that contribute to successful leadership in crisis situations were identified (Chambers, Drysdale, & Hughes, 2010). First, successful leaders are clear in their communications and make sense about what they need from others. Successful leaders are also very good at managing tensions that result from increased ambiguity and complexity of modern life. This includes asking the right questions and having the humility to admit the need to ask questions of others. Finally, successful leaders are able to inspire others with a sense of purpose. The key is transparency between what a leader asks of others and what values the leader practices in his or her own life.

Transitioning these key traits to be exemplified by leaders can be tricky. Many organizations have established leadership training programs focussed on emphasizing attributes of good leaders and teaching members who are a position of leadership how to communicate, engage people, and align their personal values with the values of the organization in a manner that will motivate others to follow along (Chambers et al., 2010). The goal is to create leaders with individual goals that fit the context of the
environment they are placed in and then to guide them in aligning their values with the values of the organization in order to inspire people to strive for a common goal.

The development of strong leaders is considered one of the most important human resource goals for achieving global success in the business world (Thorn, 2012). Certain traits are associated with desirable leaders and are universally agreed upon as important by executives of international corporations. These traits include honesty, integrity, teamwork, communication, and risk-taking (Rosen, 2000, as cited by Thorn, 2012). An international initiative to develop good leadership across the globe resulted in the development of a committee called Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE). GLOBE determined four factors of good leadership that are considered to be universal: integrity, charismatic-visionary, charismatic inspirational, and team builder (Javidan, Dorfman, Sully de Luque, & House, 2006). Traits associated with poor leadership include having a self-protective attitude, being malevolent, and being autocratic.

Leadership may not be best determined by the possession of key traits. Successful leadership, especially in times of turmoil, might rely less on individual traits and more on a complex interplay of sets of skills (Sims, 2010). Beginning with the contemplative art that is understanding the task, the self, and the others, leaders are the people who put together groups that are best suited to tackle the task and to source the needed resources. When tackling diverse issues, many approaches need to be taken from many angles and that requires resources, knowledge, and specialized skills that cannot be offered by only one individual. The job of the leader is not to personally provide a solution to the problem, but to know the situation and how to best approach it. The leader then assembles a group and manages the relations between the group members while motivating them to keep a common goal in mind. In this sense, the leadership role is less about finding solutions and more about asking the right questions, identifying the critical components, and fostering an environment where different parties can come together and each contribute what is needed to achieve the desired outcome. The development of good international leadership for Long-term Crisis situations would best be served by finding a visionary leader who had the skills to bring together and motivate specialists to achieve a common goal that is good for all of humanity, not just some subgroups.

Conclusion

The idea of a Long-term Crisis situation was created because of my specific interests in the direction the world is going and the issues that I believe future societies and therefore future leaders will encounter. As such, there is no research dealing specifically with the concept of Long-term Crises. In the search for research pertaining to this question then I looked for literature on framing situations that arise from change, leadership in times of crisis, and international leadership strengths. I hoped to address the component issues I believe come together when a Long-term Crisis is encountered.
There is only very recent preliminary research on what makes effective leaders in a global sense. I believe this is due to the difficulty in studying international corporations due to their breadth and diversity. It is very difficult to focus on a single research question when so many factors need to be considered and the dynamic of the same organization may be very different depending what country you are in. However, with the boom of globalization and the rise of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, there is a shift of power away from the government and into the hands of global groups, and I believe leadership research should also shift its sights upwards to study this.

There is also limited research on successful leadership in crisis situations. Most research in this field looks retrospectively at businesses that have survived a “crisis”. The research focuses on what the corporations have since identified as leadership imperatives. It is understandable why it is difficult to actively study leadership during a crisis since it is hard to predict when a crisis will occur and it is unethical to induce anything that would be deemed a crisis for investigative purposes. The literature on leadership during crises and international leadership do seem to point to a common factor: vision and the ability to bring people together under that vision.

There is a lot of research about framing and how it affects people’s perception of situations. Most of the research points towards how the problem is framed and identifying the problem type. Although accurately identifying the type of situation is critical, I would like to see research focus more on how people frame their approach to problems. In my opinion, the true nature of many problems cannot be changed by framing it differently, it is only misrepresented. This causes serious setbacks when considering any possible course of action to divert a potential crisis. For example, people who are looked upon as leaders may claim that global warming is or is not an issue. Sometimes these claims are based on personal agendas that have little to do with the reality of global warming, but that does not make the true nature of the problem any more or less real. I believe that a shift in focus from “what” the problem is to “how” it is best to deal with the problem may reveal some ulterior motives that people have in their approach to different situations. Because the nature of Long-term Crises lack the urgency that demands immediately intervention, leaders who are best able to identify and tackle problems of this nature will need to be able to objectively approach situations with minimal biases and no hidden agendas, or be open to feedback from others as a means of keeping their subjective interpretations in check.
References


Issues of Power and Dominant Masculinity in Pinter’s *The Collection* and *The Homecoming*

By: Beth Kelln

Pinter’s plays *The Collection* and *The Homecoming* address issues of gender and power relations. *The Collection* portrays two men, James and Harry, trying to find out whether their partners, Stella and Bill respectively, were unfaithful. In *The Homecoming*, Teddy brings his wife Ruth home to his male family—his brothers Lenny and Joey, father Max, and uncle Sam—who plan to keep her as a mother/housewife who will earn her keep through prostitution. Both plays offer primarily-male social circles, influenced by one woman. *The Collection* shows the interpersonal conflicts caused by ideas of traditional, physically-dominant masculinity, and more generally, through a comparison of the two couples, highlights issues of power inequality in relationships. *The Homecoming* pushes further the problems of violent masculinity and its dominance in society, by showing not only the effects on the subjugated females, but also the effects on men themselves. Overall, these two plays by Pinter offer a critique of power dynamics in relationships and society, particularly as related to gender.

In *The Collection*, James and Stella’s marital problems are likely caused by James’ insistence upon traditional gender roles. Whether true or not, Stella, it seems, has told James that she slept with Bill at the fashion design conference in Leeds, though this seems unlikely, given Bill’s homosexual relationship. When James tells Stella that he plans to see Bill, Stella questions his decision: “I just don’t see… what there is to be gained. What’s the point of it?” (*Collection* 141). In this, she suggests that James need not confront Bill—his problem is with Stella. When James does not reply, she asks, “What are you going to do, hit him?” (141), fearing James’ violent tendencies, to which he responds, “I want to know what his attitude is” (141). Although Stella introduced this incident, James focuses on Bill, trying to preserve his own sense of masculinity—he must blame Bill for the affair to avoid acknowledging fault in his wife or his own relationship. Stella pleads with James, “He doesn’t matter […] He’s not important” (141), but James cannot look beyond the other man to the greater issue, his own poor relationship, and insists, “It was him. That’s why I think he’s worth having a look at” (142). James fixates on what qualities of Bill incited this incident, and doing so, James compares himself to Bill, stating, “He’s got the right attitude, you see. As a man, I can only admire it” (143). When Stella challenges, “What is his attitude?”, James criticises, “What’s your attitude?” (143). James can only acknowledge Stella through his own anger, and cannot sincerely look beyond this incident to why Stella may or may not have been unfaithful.

As Diamond suggests, “James’s emotional limitations prevent him from responding deeply to any feelings beyond his own sense of crisis” (118). While Stella likely hoped she could force James to
acknowledge issues in their marriage and “hoped [he’d] understand” (“Collection” 143), her strategy has exacerbated James’ “emotional limitations” by challenging his sense of manhood as possession of a faithful wife. Jackson Katz argues that popular culture teaches men that “the actual living, breathing humanity of girls and women matters a lot less than turning them into trophies to prove you’re a real man” (Tough Guise 17). As such, James states at the end of the scene, “you’ve opened up a whole new world for me” (144), followed by a blackout. This emphatic line shows his focus on his own crisis, as caused by Stella’s actions, rather than on the humanity and cause of Stella’s actions. James’ need to control his wife and deal with outside threats to their marriage, rather than internal threats, causes issues for the pair.

Furthermore, James’ dependence on representations of traditional, physical masculinity is shown through his interactions with Bill. Katz argues that men are socialised to believe that “real men turn to violence not as a last resort, but as the go-to method of resolving disputes” (Tough Guise 13), a message which James seems to internalise. When James initially arrives to interrogate Bill, Bill tries to close the door on James before James puts his “foot in door” (“Collection” 128). After beginning their interaction with physical intimidation, the men have a battle of words, Bill criticising and evading various pieces of James’ story, until James asserts, “When you treat my wife like a whore, then I think I’m entitled to know what you’ve got to say about it” (131). James calls upon his masculine claim of possession to justify his actions. The men continue their battle of words, which Diamond argues “testifies to [Bill’s] stubborn unwillingness to be intimidated by a physically stronger male” (117), but when Bill suggests James leave, James “makes a sudden move forward” (“Collection” 135), knocking Bill to the floor, forcing him to tell “the truth”, that Bill and Stella only kissed. After Bill recovers and rises, however, he challenges what James presumes happened in Leeds (that Bill sat on Stella’s bed), and thus implicitly challenges James’ assumed position of knowledge and power—as part of James’ power comes from asserting his claimed knowledge of what happened to accuse Bill of sexual and romantic impropriety—by insisting that he (Bill) was “Not sitting [on the bed]. Lying” (137). As opposed to James’ physical threats, Bill uses words to upset James’ sense of control; Bill may also be using wordplay for effect, as Diamond suggests Bill could mean he was lying, as in, not telling the truth (117). Bill increasingly challenges James’ traditionally masculine and physical claims to power.

Moreover, James becomes increasingly threatened by Bill’s alternative masculinity—by qualities which, though James will not acknowledge this, may be what Stella desired, initiating this conflict. During James’ second visit to Bill, Bill suggests that James has an inaccurate image of himself because he “only see[s him]self in the mirror […] which is] deceptive” (“Collection” 146), though James denies this. While Bill refers to physical qualities (James does not consider himself tall or broad), this comment could apply further—James’ self-image, his idea of himself and his identity, deceives him and prevents him
from seeing the humanity in his wife. Similarly, Bill later provokes James in saying that “Every woman is bound to have an outburst of… wild sensuality at one time or another […] It’s part of their nature […] it’s the system that’s at fault, not you” (151). Bill mocks James’ simple understanding of women and their nature, and his inability to see women as equals. Bill blames “the system”, which could be interpreted as the system of marriage, or the system of gender roles—when men treat women as possessions, women are bound to act out in some way that defies that objectification. Epitomising this issue, however, James picks up the fruit knife and challenges Bill to a duel, a chance to defend through violence his honour, which Bill has threatened by suggesting that James may not have full control over his wife. Bill puts his knife down, not feeling the same need to prove his masculinity through violence, nor feeling his honour threatened, as he does not hold possessive claims over Stella as James does, but James throws his knife at Bill, slicing Bill’s hand. When his persona of traditional masculine control is destabilised, James attempts to reclaim his identity with acts of violence.

James may come to some realisation at the end of the play, however. Bill offers a final truth: that he and Stella never touched, but simply talked about what they might do. James leaves in silence, then interrogates Stella: “That’s the truth, isn’t it […] That’s the truth… isn’t it?” (“Collection” 157). Stella remains silent, “neither confirming nor denying. Her face is friendly, sympathetic” (157). Diamond suggests that in this, Stella mirrors James’ silent responses to her questions earlier in the play (118), which may signal an inversion—James has finally experienced being powerless, as Stella was. Dukore confirms that the two couples’ reunions at the end of the play “do not constitute returns to the status quo, for the unknowing member of each couple has been psychologically shattered” (34). James seems to be shattered by Bill’s last revelation—Bill only talking with Stella is equally threatening to James, if not more threatening, than if they had slept together. While Stella and James have communication issues depicted on stage, Bill, through talking, has attained some form of intimacy with Stella which James cannot understand—a masculinity alternative to James’ possessive ideals. To some extent, James appears to have realised issues with his traditional masculinity.

Problems of power dynamics and gender are complicated, however, by the relationship of Bill and Harry. Milne offers that “At issue [in Pinter’s plays] is the critical dramatization of the abuse of power” (202), which makes more clear the comparison between couples in The Collection. Bill is marginalised in his relationship in the same way that Stella is marginalised in hers. After James’ first visit, Harry interrogates Bill about James, then warns, “I don’t like strangers coming into my house without an invitation” (“Collection” 140), emphasising his possessions: his house, and implicitly, Bill. Similarly, feeling threatened by Stella and James’ disturbance in his relationship, Harry attempts to intimidate Stella by highlighting what she does not have—his financial well-being, his long-standing relationship with Bill, and his possessive right to Bill as his protector—saying to her, “I found him in a
slum […] I gave him a roof, gave him a job […] We’ve been close friends for years” (147). He follows this comment by asking if Stella is part of the “Rags and Bags Club” (147), attempting to degrade her social status, as his own power comes from his high economic standing. Furthermore, Harry cares little about Bill as a person, but cares only about keeping his possession intact. When Stella apologises for Bill having been inconvenient, Harry ignores her, commenting, “Oh, what a beautiful kitten” (149). Similarly, Harry comes home and observes the growing confrontation between James and Bill, but does not enter until after Bill is hit and James accuses, “Now you’ve got a scar on your hand. You didn’t have one before, did you?” (153). Earlier in the play, Bill suggested that he could not be guilty of forcing himself upon Stella because he had no scars from her scratches—when James artificially verifies Bill’s guilt, Harry enters to defend his possession, criticising that Bill should have ducked, claiming that Stella made up the story, and then delivering a degrading speech in which he calls Bill a “filthy putrid slum slug” who “won’t keep his place” (155). Stokes argues that this speech shocks audiences in “its vindictive determination to keep the spatial hierarchies […] firmly in place” (35). The shocking effect of Harry’s speech reveals how Bill is unjustly oppressed in his relationship. Bill is a man, and thus would be equal to Harry if gender was the only issue present, and yet Bill is oppressed like Stella. The obviously unjust treatment of Bill puts into question both the treatment of his cross-stage female counterpart and the presence of unequal power dynamics in general. Through the comparison of these two couples, *The Collection* works to challenge abuses of power.

Like *The Collection*, *The Homecoming* establishes a norm of dominant masculinity, though more violent than the former play. Even from the start of the play, father and son Max and Lenny compete for dominance, Lenny ignoring Max’s simple questions until asking, “Why don’t you shut up?” (“Homecoming” 23), to which Max replies by threatening Lenny with his stick. Max continues by reminding Lenny that he (Max) is “still strong”, and that he and his friend MacGregor “were two of the worst hated men in the West End of London” (24). Quigley offers that “Max, who clearly lacks the physical ability to impose his will on Lenny, resorts to psychological maneuvers which alternate between attempts to compete with Lenny and attempts to excuse himself for being unable to do so” (180). In this sense, Max fits Katz’s argument that men are socialised to view violence as “the primary means of winning respect and establishing masculine credibility” (*Tough Guise* 13). Throughout the play, Max repeatedly attempts to re-establish his power through threatening physical violence with his stick, or using violent language, telling Lenny, for example, “You’ll drown in your own blood” (“Homecoming” 52). Max similarly uses derogatory female insults to put down his male family members, calling Lenny “you bitch” (27) and Sam “you tit” (56). Lenny takes advantage of Max’s insecurity, and mocks his threats: “Oh, Daddy, you’re not going to use your stick on me, are you? Eh?” (27). The men’s interactions are filled with violence, which is clearly normative in their world. Jiji remarks that “the amount of overt
violent language is so great that it becomes almost a background noise, which is not heard, because it is not attended to, but which is loud enough to interfere with our hearing any other sounds that might be there underneath” (109). The violence is overwhelming to an audience yet completely normalised to the characters, suggesting that male dependency on violence is a major issue of the play.

Furthermore, violence and manhood are repeatedly associated with war. When Max insults Sam’s respectability as a chauffeur, and Sam insists that he fought in the Second World War, Max challenges, “Who did you kill?”, followed by a silence and Sam’s exit (“Homecoming” 64). This emphatic exchange illustrates how the men’s identities are tied not only to their serving their country, but, at least for Max, to killing for their country. Moreover, war imagery is repeatedly used in connection with sexual violence. In Ruth and Lenny’s initial conversation, after Ruth states that she and Teddy visited Venice, Lenny remarks, “I’ve always had a feeling that if I’d been a soldier in the last war—say in the Italian campaign—I’d probably have found myself in Venice” (46), establishing a connection with her through imagined, glorified violence. Immediately after establishing his Venice connection, he asks to hold Ruth’s hand, which he justifies through an extended monologue about considering killing a prostitute, as it was “all quiet on the Western Front” (47). Similarly, when Lenny and Joey later recount their rape of two girls, they emphasise that they “took them over a bombed site. / Rubble. In the rubble. / Yes, plenty of rubble” (83). Through such explicit comparisons, Pinter seems to question the connection between the sanctioned, glorified violence of war, and the horrifying assaults the men describe—does war reinforce ideals of violent masculinity that have oppressive repercussions for gender relations? Furthermore, in Tough Guise 2, Katz describes how western male culture has repeatedly responded to social change in gender relations by reclaiming, even more harshly, their violent ideals of masculinity. He notes, for example, the resurgence of anti-feminist media during the rise of women joining the workforce following the Second World War, “explicitly designed to keep alive the traditional equation between masculinity, dominance, and control at a time of democratization and change” (26). These comments seem particularly fitting in this post-war play: as the men adjust to changing social circumstances and women increasingly threaten their dominance, the men reclaim their identities through increasing levels of violence.

The role of Ruth in this play serves to emphasise the pervasive nature of traditional male dominance. Aragay argues that “through Ruth, the play explores the question as to whether it is possible to resist the power relations […] imposed by the dominant patriarchal order” (248). Throughout the play, Ruth confronts the men’s objectifying mentalities. After Lenny’s monologue about assaulting a prostitute because she had “the pox” (“Homecoming” 46), Ruth challenges, “How did you know she was diseased?” (47). Similarly, after Max’s idealised monologue about his domestic bliss with Jessie while he worked as a butcher, Ruth sees through his façade and ignores his domestic story, asking, “What happened to the group of butchers?”, bringing forth Max’s true aggression: “They turned out to be a bunch of criminals
like everyone else” (63). Ruth makes evident the men’s aggressive natures, and shows her understanding of her society’s objectification, arguing that “Perhaps the fact that [her lips] move is more significant… than the words which come through them” (69). Dukore suggests that Ruth gains power in the household through adapting to her environment: “When the men vie, she—the only woman present—stops their dialogue by stressing the importance of her sex and sexuality” (37).

Furthermore, many critics argue that Ruth uses her understanding of the men to control them by the end of the play, when she apparently agrees to become a wife/mother substitute for the family and to earn her own keep through prostitution. Diamond argues that Ruth embodies the sexually-aggressive and business-savvy woman the men most fear (148), while Dukore suggests that “the apparently victorious males who remain are acted upon by the sole woman in their midst, who controls them” (42). Raby even states that the ending “suggests healing […] and a sense of peace […] stillness” (69). These arguments may oversimplify the situation, however. Diamond offers that although Ruth is triumphant in the play’s final tableau, in which she is seated with Max and Joey kneeling on either side of her, this tableau is unstable. While Ruth sits relaxed, Max worries, “She’ll use us […] She won’t… be adaptable” (97), and Lenny stands silently watching Ruth, threatening. Even if Ruth does somehow dominate this system, she is still simply working within a misogynistic system which degrades her. She stays in a world in which women can hope to be remembered as “[not] such a bad bitch” (25), and in which, according to Lenny, women can be assaulted or even killed if they do not fulfill their purpose. Ruth perhaps takes control of her situation, but her situation is by no means triumphant. Furthermore, her apparent victory is complicated by her lack of choice. Even with Teddy, who seems perhaps a less violent choice if nothing else, Ruth can at most be “a wonderful wife and mother […] and] a very popular woman […] with] lots of friends” (66), married to a man as lost in his critical works as his family members are in their objects. Ruth has little hope for fulfillment other than controlling the men, for as long as she can, through their own narrow conceptions of women.

While *The Homecoming*, like *The Collection*, establishes issues present in dominant conceptions of masculinity, it goes further than *The Collection* in implicating bystanders of oppression. In describing his work with the Mentors in Violence Prevention program, Jackson Katz says that he and his fellow facilitators focus more on targeting bystanders than perpetrators of assault, as “men in our society in general, have been socialized to be passive bystanders in the face of sexist abuse and violence” (“Reconstructing” 168). Katz states that when men do not actively object to abuse, they implicitly sanction it. Throughout *The Homecoming*, Sam struggles with his familial role as a bystander, or even an enabler of abuse. Initially, Sam desires to set himself apart from his abusive family members and MacGregor, reminding Max, “You wouldn’t have trusted any of your other brothers [with Jessie]. You wouldn’t have trusted Mac, would you? But you trusted me” (“Homecoming” 34). Sam continues by
confirming that MacGregor is dead, then criticises, “He was a lousy stinking rotten loudmouth. A bastard uncouth sodding runt. Mind you, he was a good friend of yours” (34). In this, Sam criticises MacGregor’s misogyny, and implicitly criticises Max for his friendship with MacGregor, though Sam cannot directly criticise his brother who threatens to “give [Sam] the boot” (35). While Sam initially speaks to distinguish himself, Lenny implicates Sam in his crimes, saying that killing the prostitute would have been easy as “the chauffeur [Sam] would never have spoken. He was an old friend of the family” (47).

As the play goes on, Sam attempts to improve conditions in his house. After Max’s emasculating question, “Who did you kill?” (64), Sam seems to realise the danger this environment poses for Ruth, and shakes her hand before exiting, acknowledging her as a peer, of sorts. Later, realising his need for allies, Sam tries to win over Teddy, asking, “What did you think of [MacGregor]”, though Teddy denies this opportunity, insisting, “I liked him” (78). Finally, at the end of the play, during negotiations regarding Ruth’s future living arrangements and employment, Sam cries, “MacGregor had Jessie in the back of my cab as I drove them along”, and then collapses (94). Sam finally admits his guilt as a bystander, but being the only one willing to express his disgust, Sam is largely ignored and dismissed as having “a diseased imagination” (94). At this point, seeing the men’s refusal to acknowledge the fault in their mentalities and actions, Ruth concedes that their plan sounds “very attractive” (94). Sam’s dramatic final line and collapse show the personal implications for bystanders of abuse, and the greater implications for society that only a minority of individuals are willing to confront issues of violent masculinity.

Joey acts as a more subtle bystander in the play. Joey often seems to be interpreted as simple-minded, concerned only with physical gratification—“slow and strong… [embodying] strength and sexual potency” (Esslin 162). Joey’s dialogue, however, may indicate some discomfort with the attitudes of his father and brothers. When Max verbally assaults Ruth and asks Joey to throw Teddy and Ruth out of the house, Joey defends them, while excusing Max, insisting, “He’s an old man” (58). Later in the play, when Lenny asks Joey how his time with Ruth was, Joey dismisses him, asking, “What’s it got to do with you?” (“Homecoming” 81). After Joey admits he “didn’t get all the way” with her, Lenny blames Ruth, calling her a tease; while Joey could easily agree and insist upon his desirability, he denies: “I didn’t say she was a tease” (82). When Teddy suggests “Perhaps he hasn’t got the right touch” (82), implying that he himself must have the “right touch”, Joey does not respond, though Lenny attempts to defend Joey, prompting him to narrate their recent rape of two girls. Katz argues that “gang rape is often an expression of a twisted kind of group ritual in male culture in which otherwise ‘regular’ guys perform for and bond with each other by dehumanizing and abusing women” (Tough Guise 33), a mentality to which Lenny seems to subscribe, but Joey seems hesitant in sharing this story. Joey needs regular prompting from Lenny, often merely repeats Lenny’s details—“[Lenny:] Up near the Scrubs. / [Joey:] Yes, up over by the Scrubs...” (83)—and takes frequent breaks in speech, signalled by ellipses, either trying to remember details or
searching for how best to tell this shameful story which Lenny promotes. Lenny finishes his story of their combined deviance, which is followed by a pause, broken by Joey’s suggestion: “I’ve been the whole hog plenty of times. Sometimes… you can be happy… and not go the whole hog” (84). Through his refusal to label Ruth as a tease, his hesitance in proclaiming his assault, and his insistence that his seeming lack of success with Ruth does not bother him, Joey may belong to what Jackson Katz describes as a “‘silent minority’” of men who dislike other men’s boastful stories of sexual exploitation but “keep their discomfort to themselves rather than express disagreement or intervene in an environment which they perceive as unsympathetic” (“Reconstructing” 166-167). Joey, like Sam, may be a bystander uncomfortable with the misogyny of his family.

Joey’s role as a bystander, however, is complicated by his staged interactions with and regarding Ruth. Immediately following Joey’s insistence that he is fine with not going the “whole hog”, Max and Sam enter. Lenny informs Max that Ruth is a tease, but offers that “[Teddy] gets the gravy” (85). Teddy already suggested this, to which Joey offered no response, but when Max suggests his belief, asking “you think so?”, Joey explodes: “No he don’t. […] I’ll kill the next man who says he gets the gravy” (85). Joey’s reaction seems odd given his lack of reaction to the same issue earlier, but Max’s presence has changed the circumstances. Quigley suggests that in Pinter’s plays, “In any situation a particular character’s reaction to a particular incident is likely to be as dependent on who else is present as on the other characteristics of the external incident” (68-69). Joey’s violent reaction may be an attempt to prove himself a man according to his father’s ideals of violent masculinity. This may also explain his earlier kissing of Ruth. Joey walks in with Max and finds Lenny kissing Ruth, so Joey takes Ruth from Lenny to prove himself equal to his brother in his father’s watching eyes, “look[ing] up at Teddy and Max” for approval (“Homecoming” 75). Joey appears to maintain somewhat of a façade to earn respect from his father.

Joey’s guise of traditional masculinity starts to slip, however, when Lenny and Max suggest making Ruth a prostitute, and Joey realises he will have to share her (88). Joey repeats three times, “I don’t want to share her” (“Homecoming” 88-89), seemingly fitting with his earlier discomfort over his story of gang rape. This outburst could mark a more vocal resistance to the violent, masculine community which he is expected to embrace, in which shared sexual exploitation bonds men. His possessive stance, however, suggests that Joey is not entirely free of harmful conceptions of gender relations. Joey’s outburst is again triggered by his father—Joey first questions Lenny’s proposal, asking “what’s all this”, after Max asks Lenny why he won’t give Max a flat, and Lenny responds, “You’re sexless” (88). By embracing Lenny’s world and insisting upon his own sexual desirability, Max seems to abandon his domestic ideal of possessing a woman as a wife for Lenny’s ideal of capitalizing on men’s shared exploitation of women through prostitution. Joey’s realization of the reality of Ruth’s future comes at this
point, when Max denies the image he presented earlier of himself as a loyal husband to Jessie, an ideal which Joey may have internalized. Max earlier expounds that he cared for Jessie, “never [leaving] her short of a few bob” and promising to buy her clothes (62). Notably, before realizing and objecting to Ruth’s prostitution, Joey agrees to Ruth staying with them, and offers to give her money, as “she’s got to have some money in her pocket”, and to “buy her clothes” (86). Joey perhaps sees Ruth as his Jessie, “a nice feminine girl with proper credentials [who] makes life worth living”, whom Max has been “begging” his sons to find (65). Accordingly, Joey mirrors Max’s idealized treatment of Jessie until the prospect of Max and other “yobs” (89) sleeping with Ruth interferes with Joey’s possessive claim over her—his possessive claim also mirroring Max’s treatment of Jessie. While Joey appears uncomfortable with aspects of his father and brother’s treatment of women, he has still adopted elements of their problematic gender perspectives, further illustrating the pervasiveness of such perspectives.

Overall, The Collection and The Homecoming by Harold Pinter confront issues of unequal and oppressive power relations between genders, particularly the dominant narrative of manhood as established through violence and possession. The Collection shows the interpersonal issues that can be caused by traditional gender roles through the fragile relationship of Stella and James, and suggests the arbitrary and harmful nature of unequal power dynamics in relationships through a comparison with Bill and Harry’s relationship. The Homecoming reveals the pervasive nature of socially-constructed and enforced ideals of masculinity, through the dominance of the violent Max and Lenny in their family, the tragic arrangement Ruth pursues, and the issues of bystanders—their complicit support of abusive norms, their futility in resisting such norms alone, and the emotional stress they feel in disagreeing with dominant perspectives. Pinter may have been one of the most progressive writers of his time in boldly confronting issues of inequality and complacency.
Works Cited


Community Leadership Project: Listen to Dis’Voice Fundraiser

By: Laura Beatch

Leadership is a concept that is best learned through practice, not merely study. While the theoretical aspects and results of research provide pertinent insight, people can only learn how to lead and work with others through community engagement. To that end, I have partnered with two classmates to organize a fundraiser dinner for a community group, called Listen to Dis’ Voice, in which I had a personal investment prior to taking this course. In this paper, I will explain what Listen to Dis’Voice does in the community; I will discuss the goal of our fundraiser; I will outline the theoretical aspects of leadership we analyzed in class, and explicitly relate the issues of decision making, motivation, and team building to the project I am undertaking; and I will conclude by discussing how I have personally applied the concepts of leadership that I learned about over the semester through the process of organizing this project.

Listen to Dis’Voice is a performance group whose membership is comprised entirely of individuals who are living with a disability. They welcome any person whose disability necessitates special assistance in the community and in their homes. This means that they include people with physical disabilities, cognitive disabilities, and people with other significant health conditions (Crann, 2012). The purpose of the group is to give these marginalized people a voice and a safe place to express themselves through the arts. Group members participate in activities like reading plays and poetry for each other, singing songs together, and learning to tell their own stories. With the support of the provincial arts organization Common Weal, Traci Foster became the leader of Listen to Dis’Voice when she saw how positively people with disabilities responded to the opportunity for artistic self-expression (Crann, 2012). Ms. Foster, an accomplished performing artist and teacher in her own right, has a history of being a leader in her field through the voice work, mask-making, and performance workshops she puts on for experienced and amateur artists alike. She uses her artistic talent to help artists with and without disabilities develop their talents, and through her work she establishes a connection between the abled and differently-abled communities.

I learned about Listen to Dis’Voice when I began tutoring a member of the group, Eva Roesner. Eva is an adult woman with Autism Spectrum Disorder. For most of her life, she was unable to communicate with other people and was told that she would never learn how to speak well or how to read. She has since defied expectations and is able not only to have complete conversations with friends and family, but is also able to perform with Listen to Dis’Voice. She credits much of her success to the support she has received from the group: she has made new friends and, through artist workshops put on by the group, has learned new skills. When I began working with Eva, her goal was to practice her
reading skills so she could read with greater independence; I never expected that my role as her tutor would turn into a role of leadership in my academic career and in my community. Academically, Eva and Listen to Dis’Voice provided the inspiration for our group project, and within the community Eva has honoured me with a nomination for a YWCA Women of Distinction Award. The latter shocked me not only because of how incredible it was that Eva was able to take the initiative to procure the nomination forms and references on her own, but also because it drove home how important our relationship is to her. The importance of perceived trustworthiness (Downey, Roberts, & Stough, 2011) can explain some of Eva’s success both in our work together and her work with Listen to Dis’Voice: because she was able to work with skilled people who are genuinely interested in her well being, she felt safe enough to take the great risk of finding her own voice. Most of us take speaking for granted, but to learn how to communicate after a lifetime of being told it was not possible takes a kind of courage and determination that is best developed within a trusting and emotionally sensitive relationship (Downey, et al., 2011).

The purpose of our fundraiser is to give the group access to funds that will enable them to put on workshops and potentially have the opportunity to perform for the community. Success for this event is important to me because in Eva I have seen the transformative effect of arts, culture, and a supportive social group. I think it is reasonable to infer that the other group members also enjoy a better quality of life as a direct result of being part of Listen to Dis’Voice. When reflecting on how Eva and the other members of Listen to Dis’Voice have created their own community bound by a collective passion for artistic expression, I am reminded of the research on emotional intelligence and trust done by Downey, et al., (2011). Their research analyzed how a culture of emotional intelligence in the workplace is related to job satisfaction and job commitment, and whether those relationships are modified by trust in the leader (Downey, et al., 2011). They found that when a team had a high level of trust in their leader, members believed their emotions were better understood not only by the leader but also by their fellow team members; these findings were predictive of commitment and satisfaction for each team member (Downey, et al., 2011). I believe that Ms. Foster has created a similar environment in Listen to Dis’Voice, and that this supportive culture is the essential ingredient to the group’s success. When people feel understood, socially connected, and perceive others as trustworthy, a climate of empathy is fostered, and this can have a profound psychological effect on the personal dedication and investment of group members (Downey, et al., 2011). The members of Listen to Dis’Voice, and their leader Ms. Foster, demonstrate this dedication by having taken the steps necessary to become a non-profit organization. The transformative power of trust in leadership is realized in someone like Eva, who now has the confidence to sing loudly with her friends. Finally, I believe that the trust and compassion each member can experience through this group can be healing for those who are too often overlooked, too often not heard, and too often mistreated (Downey, et al., 2011).
Our fundraising project exemplifies leadership in the community because it is being done for the benefit of others. My hope is that this project will have a small transformative effect on the group: by reaching out to our networks, we will be raising awareness in the community that a group like this exists for people with disabilities; by offering the group support, we will be showing them that their voices and contributions are important; by raising money for the group, we are helping them to complete more workshops and develop their dramatic and voice skills. Servant leadership is already exemplified by Traci Foster, who has taken on this project in addition to her other artistic endeavors, because she believes in the value of developing the artists of Listen to Dis’Voice. Our project fits within Walumbwa, Hartnell, and Oke’s (2010) definition of servant leadership because it is being done for the benefit of others and in celebration of what Listen to Dis’Voice has already accomplished. The entire focus is on helping the members of Listen to Dis’Voice, and while the members of our class group will receive their gratitude, we will not achieve the glory or status that is often associated with leadership (Walumbwa, et al., 2010). That being said, endeavors that are altruistic in their focus are not wholly without benefit to those undertaking them, as at the very least we shall enjoy the boost to our individual self-esteem that comes from helping others and affirming our personal beliefs in our own generosity and magnanimity (Dwyer, Bono, Snyder, Nov, & Berson, 2013).

Putting on an event is never an easy undertaking, and it requires forethought and the ability to account for the wants and needs of those who will be attending the event. Additionally, one must be able to manage and deal with people, something that requires emotional intelligence, adaptability, trust, and openness. When reflecting on the processes of decision making, motivation, and team building, this project has not been without its challenges. Membership of our class group has changed three times, as has the specific kind of event that was going to be organized. Decision-making was an unexpected challenge I encountered in this project. There was an initial reluctance to make decisions regarding what project to tackle, and I believe this stemmed partly from the unusual nature of the assignment and a certain level of discomfort that is associated with the unfamiliar. This discomfort led us to use our system one style of thinking, a system associated with quick, effortless cognitive processes that placed the problem at hand - choosing a project - within the context of prior assignments (Heath, 2014). However, one cannot rely on heuristics alone to resolve a complex and unfamiliar problem, and we therefore should have utilized system two earlier on in the process than we did. Determining what kind of leadership project would be realistic to accomplish within the limitations and scope of a class assignment requires creative and reflective thinking (Heath, 2014). An essential part of this brainstorming process is decisiveness, and I believe that was a weakness within our group. Leadership requires that decisions be made with consideration for the motivations and needs of group members so that they continue to feel engaged and respected, but one cannot be so focused on consideration and deference that one fails to act.
The fundraiser dinner for Listen to Dis’Voice only materialized when I decided to part ways with the group and coordinate my own event. After I began my solo project, two class members needed a project to join and offered to help; I accepted the offer because part of leadership is recognizing when one can benefit from others’ input (Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2009). In their article discussing the evolutionary aspects of leadership, van Vugt, Hann, and Kaiser (2008) broke down the cognitive processes that I believe influenced my group members’ desire to join my project: first, they recognized that success on this project required coordination, and likely felt a sense of panic due to the fast-approaching deadline of the paper. Second, the project I selected is a different experience for all of us given that no member has ever planned an event of this kind before (Van Vugt, et al., 2008). Third, by deciding on a specific project that I would undertake, I overcame the difficulties we were having as group regarding choosing a course of action; the clear goal I had in mind inadvertently placed me in a position of leadership for our small group, and perhaps the others members saw in me some level of competence (Van Vugt, et al., 2008). And finally, joining the project I had chosen became an attractive option because of the action I had already initiated. When we were trying to choose a project together, everyone sacrificed individual assertion for the sake of consideration for, openness to, and patience with (Van Vugt, et al., 2008) other group members. In other words, no one member seemed willing to be decisive lest they offend another member. This is an experience that I hope we can all learn from and apply to future group projects: while sensitivity, or perhaps emotional intelligence, is valuable, so too is decisiveness, and good leadership requires the delicate balancing act of managing both qualities.

In the beginning, there was undoubtedly a complete lack of leadership on everyone’s part, but I believe we also had challenges trying to meld different work and time management styles. This stems not only from the difficulty with decision making and the excessive attempt to focus on emotional intelligence that has been discussed, but also from different levels of motivation that affected each member’s individual organizational commitment. Dwyer, et al., (2013) outlined six broad categories to characterize volunteer motivation: some volunteer because such behaviour is congruent with their personal values; others are trying to gain greater knowledge; some are motivated to advance their career, both professional and academic; some feel guilt for perceived advantages and are moved to lessen those feelings by helping others; other volunteers are trying to enhance their own self-esteem; and some people are simply trying to connect with social groups (Dwyer, et al., 2013). In their research, Dwyer, et al., (2013) found that volunteers are more satisfied with their work when the experience satisfies the goal that motivated them to volunteer in the first place. While satisfaction was not found to be related to contribution (Dwyer, et al., 2013), I contend that a highly motivated person is more willing to take on a role of servant leadership for a time in order to ensure the success of the volunteer work, and such a person will contribute as much as they are able. I do not think that the work required for the project we
have undertaken necessarily matches the motivation of all team members. While all of us would share the motivation to benefit our academic careers (Dwyer, et al., 2013), my relationship with Eva and the Listen to Dis’Voice group has caused my organizational commitment to be higher (Downey, et al., 2011) and this emotional connection has increased my motivation. I began working with Eva because I believe those can help others should do so, and this belief falls within two of the categories discussed by Dwyer, et al., (2013). This entire experience - from learning about Listen to Dis’Voice to organizing a fundraiser dinner - was new to my team members, and in retrospect I think that choosing an organization to which we all had a connection would have increased motivation and organizational commitment.

From the experience of doing a group project - the first and only group project of my entire university career - I will take away a greater understanding of the individual differences in work styles. My personal style, which I would characterize as being controlling and highly averse to procrastination, is not necessarily conducive to team work and can benefit from the mediation of more relaxed, optimistic attitudes. Greitemeyer, et al., (2009) discussed the value of dissent within a group. Whether members genuinely disagree with the direction of a project, or whether they are merely playing devil’s advocate, dissent improves decision making by forcing the majority to consider different information or perspectives, and this can lead to better decision-making (Greitemeyer, et al., 2009). This happened within our group when we were trying to agree on a date to host the event. While we were somewhat limited by the availability of the venue, one group member felt very strongly that we choose a particular day of the week. Initially, I did not think the day of the week was particularly important, but after discussing her perspective and finding common ground in our desire to host a successful fundraiser, we were able to select a date that will, hopefully, prove successful. The process of disagreeing on an aspect of the project, finding common ground, and finding a mutually agreeable solution was a turning point for the group. We came together as a team when we found some values and motivations that were similar. From that point on, group meetings were much more productive, and our approach to leadership changed. In order for anything to be accomplished, we needed to determine what was to be done and which of us was best able to accomplish the given task. In essence, leadership became the activity we are all engaging in, as opposed to the quality of merely having the idea (Sims, 2010). Sims (2010) criticizes the focus the majority of leadership research has on individual leaders and their specific talents and attributes, and contends that the when we conceive of leadership as an activity, we must also recognize how the contributions of all team members produce the end result.

After overcoming the initial hurdles, I think our group began to function as a team when we recognized each others’ strengths (Sims, 2010) and empowered each other to take the lead on a certain aspect of the project. This division of the workload created a level of interdependence, and required all of
us to take the risk of trusting each other to complete our respective tasks. The risk to trust has thus far paid off, and we are currently in a strong position to host a successful fundraiser at the end of this month. Perhaps as important is what each member of our team has learned from this experience: even though being a leader is far more challenging than the literature would have one believe, successfully collaborating with and leading others can be unexpectedly gratifying.
References


Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* articulate a human life embedded fully in community. Virtue is aided by friendship, and requires generosity and devotion to the community. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the *Politics* suggests that humans are naturally political. To prove this, Aristotle traces the natural development of the city, and the nature of its component pieces. The traditional family and slavery are justified to allow the city's existence. In addition, Aristotle suggests that the city provides the setting for moral virtue and the fulfillment of the highest human ends. While Aristotle's judgments on slavery and the family are problematic, he is right that human beings are naturally political.

In order to prove that human beings are naturally political, Aristotle must first prove that the required setting of politics is also natural. To do this, he gives an account of the city's natural formation, first from a family, and then from a village. The first association of human beings is the family, which comes into existence for the sake of survival. This association is of a male and female for the purpose of procreation, and therefore continuation of the species. This is not done voluntarily, but rather because the absence of the family would mean the absence of humanity. The second part of the family is the relationship between master and slave for the purpose of survival. Aristotle suggests that this is a mutually beneficial association for the master can foresee with the mind, and the slave can do with the body. Were the two separated, neither would survive. Aristotle also notes that all females are not naturally slavish, though some may be. Barbarians do not have this distinction between female and slave, and it is why they are barbarians.

The family, however, cannot be truly self-sufficient. As a result, the family forms into a village for greater specialization of labour and mutual defense. Generally, the village is the outgrowth of one family as it expands. However, it could also be a collection of a few families as well. Aristotle notes that the village, as it is an extension of the family, is usually ruled by a patriarch. The implication here is that a village is not diverse enough to require more than an informal familial discipline, since it is essentially a large family.

---

When the needs of the village outstrip its capacity to provide for its people, a collection of villages come together to form the city. The city is large enough to allow for more secure defense, new trades and specializations of labour. The city can fully satisfy mere life, and stays in existence for the sake of the good life. Now that a larger group of families and villages are in one community, there must be real deliberation about political concerns. Informal familial law cannot adequately regulate the city, because there are now multiple families with multiple sets of traditions. As a result, the city must have deliberation about how its citizens act.

The city's setting of deliberation, allows for the development of moral virtue, and in particular, of prudence. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle suggests that to be prudent is to know what is best for oneself and for other human beings. Prudence, in the Aristotelian understanding, is social knowledge. In order to build this knowledge, one must experience particular things to build knowledge of which particulars are good, and which ones are bad. It seems, therefore, that in order to build prudence, one must experience being in a position of authority. The city provides an opportunity for experience by allowing for rule and being ruled in turn for political equals. In essence, public deliberation and rotation of office will be both a discussion of prudent things, and enacting prudent laws and behaviors. Prudent citizens will build virtue in the city and within themselves. For Aristotle, moral virtue is to hit a rational and personal mean between excess and deficiency in regards to a set of things. To achieve this, one must have prudence: “Moreover, prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence inasmuch as the first principles which prudence employs are determined by the moral virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by Prudence.” Therefore, one can say that prudence is the rational quality that determines the mean of moral virtue. Given that the political deliberation and rule of a city builds prudence, one can also say that moral virtue is at least much easier to build in a city, and potentially, only possible in a city.

After discussing the setting of politics, Aristotle turns to the political beings themselves. He notes a difference between human beings and animals: Animals have voice, which can express pleasure and pain. Human beings have reason and speech, which allows for discussions of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous. If human beings have reason naturally, then political deliberation, the natural outgrowth of reason and speech, must also be natural. The existence of reason

---

and speech implies that there is a difference between the pleasant and the good for human beings, and that considerations of justice have a place in determining this difference. In essence, deliberations and decisions on questions of this nature are the direct outgrowth of reason and speech. These deliberations are also called politics, which is why Aristotle suggests that human beings are naturally political. If a human being does not participate in the political, has no place in the city, and is bound by no laws of customs, they are the most immoderate creatures.\textsuperscript{15} To fulfill one's full human potential, one must engage in political behavior, and do so voluntarily. Unlike Liberal theorists, voluntary participation is not simply just participation, it is a growth experience for the human being.\textsuperscript{16}

While Aristotle's conception of human nature initially seems universal, there are some people who will not be able to achieve the good life. All human beings have reason, but not all human beings participate in reason to the same degree. The first group of people where this distinction becomes relevant is slaves. Aristotle suggests that there are human beings who are mentally undeveloped, and cannot actually engage in the good life of political deliberation.\textsuperscript{17} This is a difference in nature, not in context or situation. Natural slaves are: “those who are as different from other men as the soul from the body or man from beast – and they are in this state if their work is the use of the body, and if this is the best that can come from them”\textsuperscript{18} Since these type of people are unable to partake in the good life, which requires leisure time, the greatest purpose they can serve is to allow for leisure for others. Thus, a natural slave serves his or her highest purpose by doing the menial labour for a household, and allowing his or her master time to deliberate on justice.\textsuperscript{19} In the Aristotelian understanding, this arrangement is mutually beneficial. The master gives the natural slave a sense of purpose, akin to occupational therapy theory for mentally challenged people in modernity. The slave allows the master leisure, which both benefits the master directly, and the slave indirectly when the master deliberates on what is best for the city as a whole. Most slaves and slavery relationships, however, do not fit this description.\textsuperscript{20} Slaves are predominantly captives taken in war, with analogous natures to their captors. Aristotle concludes that while conventional slavery is indeed unjust, the good life is functionally impossible without it. Conversations of communal justice and good cannot occur when the citizens are concerned with survival. Modern technology, however, has mechanized many menial tasks via appliances like dishwashers, which slaves would otherwise complete to allow the master leisure. It is therefore possible that in an Aristotelian understanding slavery is simply a stand-in for technological advancements, and should be discarded when

\textsuperscript{15} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1253a 30.  
\textsuperscript{16} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1253a 25.  
\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1254b 15-25.  
\textsuperscript{18} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1254b 15.  
\textsuperscript{19} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1254b 15.  
\textsuperscript{20} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1255b 15.
possible. In the ancient cities of Aristotle’s time, slavery remains a necessary evil for the realization of the good life.

Aristotelean slavery does not match with the slavery practiced in ancient Greece. Natural slaves, as Aristotle describes them, would be called mentally challenged human beings. Granted, these people do exist, and they are not capable of political deliberation. Mentally challenged individuals are rare, however, and as a result cannot 'liberate' a large quantity of citizens for public deliberation. Aristotle acknowledges this fact, and proposes that the existing institution of slavery is a necessary evil. This simultaneously undermines the justice of the city, and therefore the moral virtues of its citizens, and raises a strategic problem of slave revolts. If the city aims towards justice, but deprives some people of the good life for its own convenience, is it just? Also, if slaves have natures akin to their captors, it means they are naturally political. In addition conventional slaves, unlike natural slaves, can know that the good life is their ultimate aim. As a result, slaves have an interest in rebellion or insurrection, and the rational capacity to scheme. If barred from the good life in public deliberation, enslaved political beings will create a political life by joining together to free themselves and hurt the city. Historical records of Helot revolts in ancient Sparta show that slaves act in accordance with this argument. A better solution may be the capitalist one. If basic needs were met by menial wage labour done by the poor, revolt may be less likely.

In addition to slaves, women must contend with Aristotle's requirements for the good life. Aristotle suggests that unlike in a village or independent family, marital rule in cities is political in nature.\(^\text{21}\) This implies a power rotation between equals, but Aristotle states that the man is more expert in leading and therefore the rule will have the gentle quality of political rule, but not the rotation of office. The reason for this appears to be that rule is based primarily on prudence, which requires moderation and strict control of oneself. Aristotle suggests that women are in a state of lack of self control, where they rationally know the good but do the bad regardless due to strong passions.\(^\text{22}\) While men are sometimes in this state, Aristotle suggests that women are most often in this state. As a result, they are not equally included in the good life.

This observation seems to be of poor quality, and certainly not backed by any statistical analysis. Even if one assumes this to be true, one must question why lack of self control comes to exist. Aristotle suggests that the young lack self control because they have not been habituated to virtue. Habituation occurs via education. A better conclusion would be that the in-equalitarian family structure of ancient Greece did not provide its women with adequate opportunities for habituation. Women are human beings, and therefore possess reason and speech. Accordingly, women possess the natural prerequisites for the

\(^{21}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1259b 0-5.

\(^{22}\) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 388.
development of prudence, and therefore the prerequisites for the development of virtue. Furthermore, Aristotle recognizes a separation of body and soul where soul rules the body absolutely.\textsuperscript{23} This distinction eliminates the possibility that a difference in hormones or other bodily characteristics will affect the soul, as it rules the body rather than being ruled by it. The only remaining option for this distinction is that male and female souls differ in kind. For if the difference in souls is significant enough to eliminate women from the good life, they no longer share a highest end with men, and therefore differ in their species characteristic. This line of argument leads to the conclusion that women are not human at all, which is untrue for at least biological reasons. Instead, one should conclude that gender inequality is problematic. Implicitly, Aristotle may realize this. Indeed, it seems that like slavery, patriarchy is a functional rather than logical requirement for the good life. If a city is to continue, it must have enough children. These children must be educated properly in order to be capable of reaching the good life. As a result, a person of rational quality must raise them, and spend enough time doing so that they will not have the time to engage in public life. Natural slaves, therefore cannot complete this task because they are not rational. As a result, women inherit this task in Aristotle's understanding of the city. A more just conclusion would be for child rearing to be done in sequence within the family, where one parent raises the children for a time while the other parent deliberates, and after a time the parents reverse roles. This injustice, like slavery, is justified by the goal of the good life. If child rearing was done in sequence, then neither husband nor wife would develop a large degree of prudence, and potentially not virtue as a result. Some, in Aristotle's understanding, must abandon the public good life for the sake of the continuation of the city.

While some Aristotelian structures of the city, such as slavery and patriarchy, are problematic, the contention that human beings are naturally political is good. Many animals have 'social' structures, such as packs or hives. These structures, however, are instinctual. If a hive structure is to change, it will change via evolution over many generations. It is unclear if any social creature understands itself as having interests other than its communal structure. Politics requires deliberation of competing ideas of the good or the just. This, in turn, requires that there are individuals with differing opinions and interests. One concludes that a political being must first understand itself as an individual. It must then understand that it is an individual that is also part of a community, and that this community affects and defines, to some degree, the individuals that exist within it. Therefore, a political being must understand that its interests are directly affected by the political community, and engage with this community. Ethical deliberations also require that individuals recognize their own interests first before they recognize that there could be more important or better concerns. Human beings fit these requirements, and it seems that human beings are the only creatures that do so.

\textsuperscript{23} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1254b 15
To Aristotle, the city comes into being naturally, first from the family, and then from the city. The city provides human beings with full self-sufficiency, and the opportunity to cultivate moral virtue through political deliberation. The city, therefore, allows the highest human life so it is good in addition to being natural. Human beings are naturally political, therefore, because their highest human end takes place in the city, and they possess reason and speech to fulfill the end of political deliberation. This part of Aristotle's analysis is excellent, but his patriarchal conclusions about the family, and pro-slavery stance is problematic.

Works Cited